THOMAS USK, THE TESTAMENT OF LOVE: FOOTNOTES

3 leudenesse, ignorance, lack of learning.

4 in, into.

6 dyeden, died; fette, fetched.

9 ycleped, called.

10 yeven, given.

11 yever, giver; thilke, that same; shapen, shaped.

12 souled blysse, bliss appropriate to the soul.

15 in any halve, on any side; tho, those.

17 leude, uninformed.

18 inseer, investigator.

19 pyne, pain.

22 wexynge, growing.

27 clepeth hem, call them.

33 more Britayne, Great Britain.

35 felyng, animal; Another, A second.

37 to, too; ren, run.

38 me lyst, it pleases me; liken, compare; speces, species, branches.

41 connynge, understanding.

42 leude, ignorant.

46 mokel, great; wenen, assume; more, greater.

48 mydle erth, middle-earth.

49 spece, type, species; kyndely, natural.

55 alyche, alike, equally.

56 easy bearyng, easy bearing, (i.e., moderation).

57 wight, person; that, that [which].

61 clergyal, clerical, learned.

67 privé, private, secret; soleyn, sullen, anti-social.

73 twey, two.

76 kyndly worchyng, natural operation.

77 ycleped, called.

82 writte, written.

85 gree, degree.

89 teneful, painful.

91 ferdenesse, fear.

93 Eke, Also.

96 professe, religious; reguler, lay (not having "professed" vows).

98 withsetten, resisted.

100 after, according to; mede, wealth; but if, unless; weyve, waive.

101 sey, seen.

102 passeth, surpasses; weten, know.

104 sleight, penetrating (see note); inseer, insightful viewer, reader.

105 fele, feel; nobley, nobility.

106 leude, uneducated.

108 eche, lengthen.

109 th'entré, entrance-way.

112 cop, summit; stanch, slake, staunch.

113 holpen, helped.

114 goost, spirit.

116 refrete, refrain; werbles, warblings; stoundes, times.

117 not than, don't know when; endite, compose.

118 unshyt, open.

121 reders, readers.

123 stered, directed.

126 wyte, blame that [on]; leudnesse, ignorance.

127 connyng, understanding.

128 letteth, hinders.

130 yeve, give.

131 preyse, praise.

137 drenched, drowned; spilte, slain.

140 yeveth, gives; mede, meed, wealth.

141 meded, rewarded.

144 Fole, Fool.

145 mykel, much.

148 mede, reward.

151 prevy, secret.

153 apertely, openly.

155 apartly, openly; chalenge, claim.

156 onehed, singleness.

168 leful, lawful; toforn, before.

169 unknowen, ignorant of.

170 ware, aware.

171 loked, considered.

174 surquedry, pride.

176 cleped, called; First Wercher, Prime Mover.

179 feled, felt.

182 stynteth, stops.

183 be nat, that is not.

184 al, all, whole.

188 ilke, same.

196 goodly, with a good motive.

203 leveth, leaves.

207 done, doing.

211 lackyng, blame.

212 sythen, since.

215 Ergo, Therefore.

216 longeth, belongs.

218 after-rewarde claym, may claim a reward.

222 arbitrement, will.

225 trowe, believe.

226 after-mede, reward.

227 him lyketh, pleases him.

228 leude, uninformed.

229 mokel, great; closyng, including.

230 betyde, happen.

232 teyed, tied.

234 wyte, blame; onelych, only.

238 mede, reward.

239 forwote, foreknows.

242 forwetyng, foreknowledge.

244 nygh me nere, draw nearer to me.

249 arbitrement, free will; onheed, unity.

253 mowe stande togider, may obtain at the same time.

258 wexeth, grows.

259 wot, knows.

262 wheder, whether.

265 forwetyng, foreknowledge.

274 thilke, that one.

275 wendest, assumed.

277 wote, knows.

278 coaction, compulsion.

279 defendynge, preventing, forbidding.

281 defended, prevented.

282 for I love, because I love.

283 maugre, displeasure, spite (i.e., something contrary to my desires).

285 coarted, compelled.

287 deedlyche, deadly (i.e., mortal).

288 defendeth, prohibits.

291 wete, knew.

293 wot, knows.

294 defended, hindered.

295 arbitrement, choice.

296 wene, assume.

297 forwetyng, foreknowing.

299 wyst, known.

303 defendeth, hinders.

305 for that, because.

308 that, that which.

315 swete, sweet.

316 er, before.

317 mokel, much.

318 stoundmele, sometimes.

320 demyn, judge.

322 maugre me, in spite of myself.

326 con, be able to; yeve, give.

327 by that, by the time that.

328 luste, desire; lerned, taught; wene, suppose.

330 weete, wet; brenne, burn.

331 unbyde, await.

332 supposaile, expectation; to determyne after, to be predetermined according to, or to be foretold by.

333 neigh, draw nigh.

335 wost, know.

336 al one for to say, one and the same thing.

349 that, that which.

354 Right, Just.

356 pert, open.

364 to thee-warde, toward you.

372 For, Because.

373 wot, knows.

381 queynt, curious, difficult.

390 defended, hindered.

392 that he wol, that [which] the will wants.

394 sythen, since; willyng, willingly.

396 assoyle, solve; thee blyvely, you happily.

397 is not love of wyl thorowe necessyté, there is no love in the will through necessity.

397-98 wrought thilke same wyl, did that same will operate.

398 with good wyl, willingly.

399 that, that which.

402-03 defended, blocked, prohibited.

407 yeve, given.

424 presence, i.e., present.

426 mevyng, moving.

429 wetyng, knowing; before-wetyng, foreknowledge.

432 wene, think.

435 arbitrement, deciding.

441 savour, understanding.

442 sithen, since.

443 revers, opposite.

446 bydde thee, order you.

447 alone, movement (OF aloigner). See note.

449 kyndly movyng, natural development.

450 clepe, call.

452 what part, whatever part.

454 heigheth, hastens.

460 Tho lyst, Then [it] pleased; stynt, stop.

465 henteth, takes (seizes).

468 or, before.

469 purposed, chosen; wyst, knew.

472 cleped, called.

475 mokel, much.

476 mevyng, moving; lych, like.

480 stoundes, times.

482 or, before.

485 dureth, endures.

486 onehed, unity.

491 sey, seen; wist, known.

499 nempned, named; evenlych, equally.

501 close and one, are closed and united.

504 thilke, that same.

505 gabbest, chatter.

506 moved, uttered.

514 mowe, may.

519 he, i.e., Holy Scripture.

524 sithen, since; yelke, yoke.

530 defendeth, prohibits (forbids).

538 denied (demed, judged). See note.

542 unconnyng, ignorance.

545 mokel, much.

549 nys, is not.

553 presence duryng, enduring present.

555 of tho thynges, by means of those things; ben to ben, i.e., possess being.

556 of Goddes wetyng, by His knowledge.

559-60 the noble philosophical poete, i.e., Chaucer.

562 pere, peer; schole, school.

564 assoyled, solved.

565 starieres, fabler's.

568 somdele, somewhat.

571 that God, just as God.

577 spire, shoot, sprout.

579 onbyde, abide.

582 springes, shoots.

584 soure docke, sorrel.

587 lowed, admitted.

588 setling, a slip taken from a tree and planted.

589 lyssed, healed, relieved; mote, must.

591 manace, menace.

592 lesynge, losing.

594 lusty, eagerly.

596 thy fre wyl, of thy free will.

598 lust, delight.

601 deme, judge.

603 nedes, necessarily.

608 but, except.

616 aparte, appropriate, open; his, its.

619 which, by which.

623 aptes, aptitudes.

625 equivocas, equivocation.

627 a, to.

642 ruled from, restricted from; wayters, inhibitors, interferers.

643-44 hautayn that, haughty who.

645 cleped, called.

653 nyl, will not.

654 us, use.

655 wenen, think.

656 mokel, much.

661 his, its.

664 retcheth, cares.

667 for, since.

669 dureth, endures.

670 ferdnesse no, fear nor.

671 falsheed, falsehood.

672 both, as well.

677 shonne, shun.

678 wenest, suppose.

684 trowe, believe; thou, though.

685 unbyde, abide.

687 assentaunt, assenting.

689 werchest, work.

692 apertly, plainly, openly; amaystreth, masters.

693 wrethe, wreath.

697 wexe, grow; Expowne, Explain.

698 rede, counsel.

706 springes, shoots; setlyng, plant.

707 apeyred, damaged; woxen, grown; somdele, somewhat.

708 wethers, storms; werche, cause.

709 and it, if it.

712 greves, griefs; sowe, sown.

713 accompte, account.

713-14 welked wyners, swollen vipers (see note).

714 as, such as.

715 medled, mixed; welked padde, swollen toad, frog.

716 wot, know.

719 ferdnesse, fear; leudnesse, ignorance.

721 compteth, account; cresse, trifle, sprig of watercress.

722 demed, judged.

724 wenyng, supposing.

726 leude, ignorant; nat for than, nevertheless; me, men.

727 wight, person; owen, ought.

728 wened, construed.

730 wil nat be acomered, desires not to be encumbered.

731 mokel, much.

732 sythen, since.

733 medled, mixed.

736 kyndly, natural.

737 stede, place.

738 unbyde, abide.

739 kydde, made known.

740 hye, hasten.

742 hye, high; onlofte, aloft; stynteth, ceases; his, its.

746 her, their.

749 durstest, dared.

750 unbyde, abide.

752 betyde, happen; yeveth, gives.

759 thus, so.

764 lyvelode, livelihood.

765 mowen, may.

766 tylthe, tillage.

768 meanynge, the meanwhile.

769 duryng tyme, duration.

772 jeuse, juice.

776 demen, judge.

778 mokel, much; azure, lapis lazuli.

779 atones, at once.

781 yeve, give.

783 countrevayled, weighed.

784 accompte, be reckoned.

785 yeft, gift.

789 Right, Justice; yolde, paid back.

790 quyte, repay; mede, reward.

791 nempnest, named.

794 acompted, accounted, reckoned.

796 evenhed, equity.

798 unbyde, abide.

799 medled, mixed.

801 wexyng, growing; meved, moved, discoursed.

803 wot, know.

805 leve, believe.

806 atast, taste, eat.

807 wexyng, growing.

810 woxen, grown.

811 nedes, necessarily.

814 ferforth, far.

815 thronge, thrust; leve, believe; seer, dry.

816 connyng, understanding.

817 mokel, much.

821 hardyed, [grown in] hardiness.

823 nere, were not; medled, mixed.

824 endite, write.

825 wene, suppose; recover, recourse.

826 bren, burn; gledes, sparks, burning brands.

829 palasy yvel, palsy; acomered, encumbered.

830 leudnesse, ignorance.

831 a, have; Wost, Know.

832 burjonynge, burgeoning.

834 delyvered, destroyed.

835 seer, dry; burjons, buds.

836 yve lefe, ivy-leaf.

838 wodelay, mad law or custom; tha, then.

839 spede, prosper.

840 queynt, curious, over-wrought; Freel-witted, Frail-witted.

843 printeth, make an impression.

844 hestes, commands.

845 wete, know.

846 lyst, [is] pleased; stylly, quietly, silently.

847 unwist, unknown; unwetyng, unknowing.

848 quyted, repaid.

850 perte, open; beaten of, beaten back; thilke, that same.

852 efte, again.

853 shent, destroyed.

855 Him thynketh, It seems to him.

856 leche, physician; wexeth, grows.

858 mokel, much.

859 lyte, frivolous, irresponsible.

860 not, do not know.

861 assoyle, answer.

862 leude, ignorant; demed, judged.

863 Sottes, Idiots; lette, let.

864 herted, hearted.

865 dent, blow, i.e., stroke of the ax.

869 ones, once; lesynge, [suffering a] loss.

870 oke, oak.

871 lethy, inducing Lethe-like results.

872 persed, pierced; wyre drawer, one who draws metal into wire.

878 mede, reward (usually monetary).

881 evenlyche, equally; quyte, repay.

885 yeldyng, yielding.

886 wene, suppose.

887 nyghe, nearly.

888 wot, know.

889 yeve, give.

890 garnement, garment; cote, coat.

892 yever, giver.

893 sythen, since.

894 Ergo, Therefore.

897 quitynge, repayment.

899 wyte, assign responsibility for.

901 rede, counsel.

903 mede, reward; in none halve, nowhere.

905 werche, work.

906 gyded, guided.

907 overthwartly, adversely.

910 tho, those.

911 sterte, moved; onbyde, abide.

912 me lyste, it pleases me; entermetyng, variable, hence meddling.

914 tho, then; astonyed, astonished.

916 sythen, since.

920 throwe, while; me might, one might.

924 nempne, name.

929 but for, except because; wol, desires.

931 for, if.

937 mowe, may.

939 sythen, since.

942 conseyt, conception.

943 mowe, may.

945 alowe, applaud; leaned, loaned.

947 lese, lose; it make, cause it [to be so].

953 werche, work.

957 mokel, much.

960 fordoynge, destruction.

961 withsytte, resist.

963 werchynges, workings.

966 thilke, that same.

970 behoten, promised.

971 accompted, accounted.

974 yeven, given.

978 withsytte, resist.

979 otherwhyle, at other times; me weneth, I suppose.

981 werne, were.

985 lerned, taught; nempne, name.

990 byleve, believe.

992 on, one.

994 apertly, openly.

1005 defended, prevented; without al maner nede, without any kind of necessity.

1007 hym nedeth, something is lacking in him.

1008 cleped, called; weten, know.

1010 toforngoyng, beforehand.

1014 lese, lose.

1018 incommodyté, inconvenience.

1019 yeven, given.

1020 lese, lose.

1022 mowe, might.

1024 nome, taken.

1025 unlusty, undesirable.

1031 unconnyng, ignorance; wenyng, assuming.

1034 frenesse of arbytrement, freedom of choice.

1035 halpe, helped.

1037 he, i.e., will of commodity.

1038 thralled, enslaved; sythen, since.

1040 cleped, called.

1043 veyne, vain.

1046 sythen, since.

1048-49 in kynde, natural.

1054 lese, lose.

1057 sythen, since.

1059 hardeth, to make something difficult to interpret.

1061 amendeth, i.e., He, God, amends.

1062 leneth, loans.

1063 in Him, i.e., in goodness; dothe that they ben, causes them to be good.

1064 werchen, work.

1065 lerned, taught; loketh, looks; weten, know.

1066 demed, judged; beforne-wetyng, foreknowledge.

1067 apertely, openly.

1068 in presence durynge, in the enduring present.

1070 mowe, may.

1073 werchyng, working.

1074 sleeth, slays; mokel, many.

1077 that, that one, the former.

1080 moste, most.

1083 mokel, great.

1086 wenen, assume.

1087 swetter, sweeter.

1090 reder, reader; leude, ignorant; wene, suppose.

1091 werke, work; shende, destroy.

1095 yelde, yield.

1098 gloton, villainous.

1100 mokel, great.

1101 mow, may.

1102 tenes, pains, vexations.

1104 plite, plight, condition.

1105 wimpled, veiled.

1106 Unneth, Scarcely; leude, ignorant; plites, folds.

1107 lene, loan.

1109 leudenesse, ignorance.

1110 mokel, much.

1112 yave, gave.

1113 unconnyng, ignorance.

1116 mede, reward; leude, ignorant.

1117 horisons, beseechings, prayers; yelden, yield.

1118 mowe, may.

1121 syghtful, visible; meate, food.

1122 Ryght so, Just as.

1126 yeveth, gives.

1129 frended, befriended.

THOMAS USK, THE TESTAMENT OF LOVE: NOTES

As readers will have already surmised from the Introduction to the edition as a whole, annotating TL is no easy task. This is a matter of great concern to me. There are about 800 annotations in the edition. On the one hand, we can argue that, of course, there should be no upper limit to the explanatory matter offered. On the other hand, however, realistically speaking, there has to be some limit. Knowing that practically there is an upper limit, I have endeavored to include information, wherever it is needed, that will get the reader started: from simple definitions to core bibliography and across a wide spectrum of information between, I have followed the guiding principle of helping readers know enough to decide when they need to know more.

   All annotations originating with me are unmarked. All material originating with other editors and/or scholars is marked typically by their surnames (Skeat's surname refers, unless otherwise indicated, to his 1897 edition of TL). Regarding the work of Jellech, Leyerle, and Skeat, I should observe that material originating with them usually refers to their notes on a particular word, phrase, or moment in TL within the sequence of their textual notes. I am particularly grateful to Schaar for his closely reasoned emendations of corrupt passages.
   Of Skeat's annotations, I have retained generally those that provide source and background information and have omitted those that are primarily his speculations. With the work of Jellech, Leyerle, and Schaar, I have exercised my judgment always on the principle of helping the reader get started.

Abbreviations: Boece: Chaucer's translation of the Consolation of Philosophy; BD: Book of the Duchess; CA: Confessio Amantis; CT: Canterbury Tales; Conc.: De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio; Conf.: Confessions; Cons.: Consolation of Philosophy; EETS: Early English Text Society (o.s., Original Series and e.s., Extra Series); HF: House of Fame; MED: Middle English Dictionary; N&Q: Notes and Queries; OED: Oxford English Dictionary; PPl: Piers Plowman; PL: Patrologia Latina; Purg.: Purgatorio; T&C: Troilus and Criseyde; Th: Thynne; TL: The Testament of Love

Book 3

1 Of nombre. Jellech (p. 404) notes that this is a standard definition, derived ultimately from Boethius' De Arithmetica: "Numerus est unitatum collectio vel quantitatis acervas ex unitatibus profusa" [A number is a collection of unities, or a big mass of quantity issuing from unities (p. 76)].

4 in thre tymes is devyded. Recent studies of the extensive lore of the ages in English include Burrow (pp. 5-11; 66-92) and Dove (pp. 120-21). After St. Augustine, six is the norm for the number of ages prior to the Last Judgment in the later medieval period (Burrow, p. 80). I suspect that Usk has conflated the lores of three and six and has again proved somewhat atypical; however, in this case, his position -ages of deviation, grace, and joy -is certainly a very recognizable one in terms of the contemporary lore (see Burrow, p. 6 especially). Deviacion equates with life under the Old Law; grace is life after the Advent of Christ; joy is the life eternal after death. It is pertinent here to observe that TL, after it has been re-ordered through the Bradley-Skeat shift, as modified by Bressie, contains 33 chapters (not counting the Prologue) -see Medcalf's summary, pp. 44-45 above, for a quick count.

5 Deviacion. Th: Demacion, where the three consecutive minims for u [v] and i have been read as m. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

9 Grace. Not capitalized in Thynne. I have followed Skeat so that the designation of the second time is parallel with the first -Deviacion. So too Joye in line 13.

19 that. Th: is. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle, though Leyerle keeps Thynne's is (i.e., [that] is cryed).

20 whiche is faylinge. Schaar would read: whiche is <eke yeven to> faylinge, with the gloss "Which is also given to weakness without its deserving it." The actual wording he continues, "may of course have been different, but I think this must have been Usk's meaning" (p. 32).

faylinge. Leyerle emends to [av]aylinge.

20-21 whiche is faylinge without deserte. Skeat glosses deserte as "merit"; he suggests that the phrase is out of place here, and perhaps belongs to the preceding clause, after shewed in line 19 (p. 479).

21 and. Leyerle emends to in.

26 whit. Th: with. Leyerle's emendation, following Skeat. Later in the line he emends jewel to jewel[es].

26-27 us Englissh people. Skeat (p. 479) suggests that "Usk says the English alter the name Margarite-perle to Margery-perle, whereas Latin, French, and many other languages keep the true form."

29 Margery perles the. Leyerle, following Skeat, emends: Margery perles [by] the.

33 the more Britayne. That is, greater Britain (i.e., England, Scotland, and Wales), as distinguished from lesser Britain (Brittany). See Appendix 1 below. The same lore is found in Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 1, chapter 1 (p. 33); Suetonius reports that "pearls seem to have been the lure that prompted [Caesar's] invasion of Britain; he would sometimes weigh them in the palm of his hand to judge their value" (p. 34).

34-37 On the capacity of pearls to control passion and staunch bleeding, see the Peterborough Lapidary (Evans and Serjeantson, pp. 107-08). The Lapidary identifies pearl as "Margarita." See, further, Appendix I below (p. 415).

35 Another is good. Schaar suggests that the sentence should begin: Another good is: it is profitable helthe ayenst passions etc. (p. 32). Leyerle follows Schaar, but uses a comma instead of the colon.

38 speces. Jellech notes that speces as used here by Usk is one of the scholastic neologisms of Middle English uncovered by John Conley and listed by him in his article ([1964], p. 209). So too opinyon in line 41 (p. 409).

40-41 good lyvyng, according to Jellech, means "living . . . the life of a good man; ethics" (p. 409).

50-51 arsmetrike . . . astronomye. Usk here is drawing on the tradition of the seven liberal arts, composed of the trivium and quadrivium. On the quadrivium, or "four ways" to knowledge (i.e., arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy) see Wagner, pp. 2-6 and 150-53.

54 prudence, justyce, temperaunce, and strength. On the four cardinal virtues (Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude), see Piltz, p. 181.

59 One is arte. Jellech suggests that the completing phrase, "of logic," may have dropped out, although the MED does enter art (1.c) as being used alone to mean dialectics or rhetoric (p. 411). Skeat remarks that "it was usual to introduce here the trivium, or second group of the seven arts . . . which contained logic, grammar, and rhetoric. For the two former he has substituted `art,' the general term" (p. 479).On the trivium, or "three ways" (to knowledge), see Wagner, pp. 6-9 and 23, especially.

64 Ordre of homly thinges. I.e., domestic economy (Jellech, p. 411).

73ff. twey. Skeat (p. 479) differentiates natural and reasonable as the twey. The third is moral. Hence, he suggests, the following scheme.

                                     natural: the quadrivium

             relating to the body <  

Philosophy <                         reasonable: the trivium 



             relating to the soul    moral: the cardinal virtues 



           law: natural

Law  <     right: reasonable

                        written: constitution

           custom: < 

                        unwritten: usage

See further Piltz, p. 197.

75 lawe, right, and custome. Jellech points out that the division of law into three kinds goes back at least to Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae v.10, and became a commonplace of medieval political thought (p. 413). See Gilby, pp. 60-61. Lawe equates with natural law and right with civil law. See further King, p. 141; Pennington, p. 424; and Canning, pp. 454-56.

78 constitution is a technical legal term, equating with "statutes." See Jellech, p. 413.

85 strength. Th: strentgh. Emended by all.

87 Cause, forsothe, in ordaynyng of lawe. As Jellech notes, the "theory set forth here of the origin of law in men's evil wills is Augustinian" (p. 414); for a helpful overview, see Markus, pp. 108-11, especially 110.

90 harme for harme. Skeat: "That is, so that harm, (as punishment) for harm, should restrain evil-doers by the bridle of fear" (p. 480).

96 and unworthy. Skeat: "even if they be unworthy."

professe and reguler. Skeat observes, "the `professed' were such as, after a year of probation, had been received into a monastic order; the `regular' were such as were bound by the three monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience" (p. 480).

97 obedyencer. One bound by obedience; used adjectivally; Skeat compares Low Latin obedientiarius (p. 480).

102 at the lest. Th: the lest. Leyerle's emendation.

104 sleight. Skeat emends to sleigh.

106 I so. Skeat emends to I [am] so.

111 sende me water. Jellech sees allusions to Exodus 17.1-7 and Psalm 114.8 (p. 416).

116-17 commyng about I not than. Skeat glosses "recurring I know not when," where than reads as whan, to make sense.

117 coude I endite. Th: coude endite. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

yet at dore. Jellech suggests an allusion to Revelations 3.7. The statement is in the way of a prayer with the antecedent for whiche, line 118, being key of David which is an image of Christ, as Leyerle observes (pp. 361-62). Jellech thinks the clause would be better placed following vnshyt (p. 417). See also John 10.9.

117-19 Schaar inserts the between at and dore and places the phrase and He bring me in between closeth and whose (p. 32).

118 whiche that childrens. The allusion is to Matthew 21.16.

119 wel. Skeat emends to wol, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

119-20 whose spirite . . . lyketh. The figure of David equates with Christ or the Holy Spirit. The reference here is to John 3.8 and I Corinthians 12.11 (see Jellech, p. 417).

123 frenship plesance. Skeat emends to fren[d]ship [in] plesance, followed by Leyerle.

126 wyte that the. Leyerle emends to wi[te]th that [to] the.

128 wyttes in many. Th: wyttes many. Skeat's emendation, accepted by Leyerle but not Jellech. Schaar emends in to of.

135 and me wondreth . . . in the lawe. Jellech wonders what the verb "pass in" means. "Possibly it is the same as `pass over' or `skip over.' In his reply to Love Usk seems to quibble on a sense of `pass' as `to ford' or `to walk through water'" (p. 419).

141 innocent. Th: innocet. Silent emendation in Skeat, followed by Jellech, but noted and followed by Leyerle.

142-43 lybel of departicion. A bill (or writ) of separation; taken from libellum repudii in Matthew 5.31, which Wyclif translates by "a libel of forsakyng" (Skeat, p. 480). See Henryson's Testament of Cresseid, line 74, for a comparable literary usage.

143-44 Ye, ye . . . of desertes. Skeat reads the sentence as follows: "I find, in no law, (provision for) recompensing and rewarding in a bounteous way, those who are guilty, according to their deserts" (p. 480). Jellech opposes this reading, complaining that it "does not alter the tenor of the sentence as we have it in Thynne, but that meaning [i.e., in Thynne] goes against the tenor of the preceding and following statements of Love" (p. 420). Here I would intervene against Jellech but not necessarily for Skeat. It is possible to construe this and the following sentence as transitions, very abrupt and unprepared for in the preceding sentences, to a consideration of conversions and how the same law that condemns the guilty can also acknowledge and reward the guilty who have converted. The examples, then, that follow would illustrate this principle. Note that in this construal, Jellech's complaint that Skeat's "reading of in goodnes as `in a bounteous way' does not conform to any meaning of the term recorded in the MED," becomes irrelevant since we need read the phrase only as "reward in [i.e., with] goodness" to follow the construction I am proposing.

145ff. Paulyn. Th: Pauly, followed by Leyerle. Skeat emends to Pauly[n], i.e., Paulinus, but suggests there is some mistake. "Perhaps he refers to L. Aemilius Paullus, brother of M. Aemilius Lepidus the Triumvir. This Paullus was once a determined enemy of Caesar, but was won over to his side by a large bribe" (p. 480). Jellech follows Skeat.

147-50 This lawe . . . treason. Jellech cites Schaar, who makes two plausible suggestions for its emendation: "First, he judges this lawe to refer to a passage about laws against conspiracies which has been lost, since there is no earlier reference for is acompted in to. Using Higden's account of the Civil War as a guide to Usk's possible attitude towards those events, he concludes that for Usk the conspiracy was on the part of Caesar, and that it was Cato who was considered to have thwarted the betrayal of the republic by Caesar. Consequently, Schaar would emend the passage as follows: `This law in Rome hath yet his name of measuring, in mede, the bewraying of [a] conspiracy. Ordayned by the senatours, the deth [of] Julius Cesar is acompted into Catons rightwisness; for ever in trouth florisshes his name among the knowers of reason.' I have incorporated Schaar's proposals into my text, except for the indefinite article `a' which is often not used by Usk, though it seems necessary to modern ears" (p. 420). Leyerle and I, also, in the main, concur with Schaar.

150 treason. Th: reason. Leyerle's emendation.

150-52 Perdicas. Skeat: "Perdiccas, according to the romances, succeeded Alexander the Great; see note to Book 2, [line 180]. I do not find the anecdote referring to Porus. It is not improbable that the author was thinking of Philip the physician, who revealed to Alexander `a privy hate' entertained against that monarch by Parmenion; see the Wars of Alexander, lines 2559-83" (p. 480).

152-55 Heyworth (pp. 144-45) would re-punctuate. He argues that

The author's meaning is clarified if reward is allowed the rare sense "estimation, worth" recorded by OED (under reward sb^I I 3) only in two texts from the fourteenth century, and the punctuation slightly modified.
   Wherfore euery wight, by reson of lawe, after his rightwysenesse apertely his mede may chalenge, and so thou that maynteynest lawe of kynde and therfore disease hast suffred in the lawe. Rewarde is worthy to be rewarded and ordayned, and apartly thy mede might thou chalenge.
   That is, everyone may claim his reward to the extent that he has earned it by virtue of his goodness; so may the Dreamer, who has maintained nature's laws and suffered for his pains. Moral worth deserves to be rewarded and clearly the Dreamer is justified in claiming what is due to him.

154 Schaar would omit rewarde and change is to art (p. 34).

155-58 Heyworth (pp. 145-46) would re-punctuate. He comments:

The Dreamer is here restating the law that the Lady has just enunciated: that by virtue of his goodness a man may claim the reward due to him . . .; that worth ought to be rewarded. . . . His restatement is: "Wel deseruynge in to worship of a wight without nedeful compulsion ought medefully to be rewarded." That is, merit in voluntarily doing honour to a person deserves to be rewarded. . . . Repunctuation helps to make the meaning clearer.
    Certes, quod I, this haue I wel lerned. And euer hensforward I shal drawe me therafter in onehed of wyl to abyde, this lawe bothe maynteyne and kepe (and so hope I best entre in to your grace): Wel deseruynge in to worship of a wight without nedeful compulsion ought medefully to be rewarded.

Leyerle modernizes this last sentence as follows: "Uncompelled and meritorious conduct in honor of a person ought to be rewarded richly."

158 nedeful. Th: nedefnl. Leyerle's emendation.

compulsion ought. Skeat emends to compulsion [that] ought; Schaar supplies and in place of Skeat's that, noting, "it is the speaker, not the subject, who expects reward" (p. 35).

160 avauntage. Th: avautage. Leyerle's emendation.

161 may. Skeat emends to many, suggesting a parallel structure with line 160; followed by Jellech and Leyerle. But may makes satisfactory sense.

166 right as mater. Skeat cites Guido delle Colonne's Historia Troiae: "sicut ad formam de forma procedere materiam notum est" [just as one observes matter move from form to form] (pp. 480-81). See the note to Legend of Good Women, line 1582 ("As mater apetiteth forme alwey"), where the version "sicut appetit materia semper formam" [just as matter always hungers for form] is given.

173 do by. Skeat emends to do [it] by.

178 and right. Skeat: "if right-doing were not in the original working" (p. 481).

180 recche. Th: recth. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

183 parte be. Skeat emends to part [that] be.

191 muste do good nedes. Skeat: "must necessarily do good" (p. 481).

194-95 Aristotel . . . in understanding. Skeat refers to Nicomachean Ethics I.1.2 and 5; but Jellech notes that by Usk's time this was standard medieval moral doctrine. See further Piltz, p. 179.

195-97 and he that . . . must nedes be bad. Jellech: "The contrasts Usk seems to make are sufficiently clear, although the syntax is not. In line [195] I have emended Thynne's verb phrase `doth away,' meaning `to turn away from,' to doth alway, because Thynne's reading would not provide any contrast between the act and the ends for which it is done. Also, in line [195], Thynne's `he that' seems a certain instance of dittography, because there are only two kinds of good acts under consideration, not three. One kind is to do good and not take account of the ends for which it is done, which merely cancels out the goodness. The other kind is to do good, but not in a good manner or by a good means so that the direction of the end is perverted" (p. 425).

196 goodly and draweth. Th: goodly draweth. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

199 doth nat goodly. Th: doth goodly. Skeat's emendation.

203 ever. Th: even. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle. Even does make some sense, however.

210 commended. Th: eommended. Leyerle's emendation.

213 Clerkes . . . is blessed. Jellech cites St. Augustine, De Trinitate 13.8: "Quia beatus nolens nemo fit" [because no one becomes blessed against his will] (p. 427).

215 ne service in that is. Skeat emends to ne service [is] in that [that] is; followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

218 may after-rewarde. Th: after reward. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

229-30 so mote . . . it nat betyde. Jellech: "So mote it be nedes and otherwyse may it nat betyde are definitions offered for the terms `necessary' and `necessity'" (p. 428).

234 desyreth. Jellech emends to deserveth.

237-38 if it . . . or of mede. Compare Boethius, Cons. 5. pr. 3. 73-88.

239-43 Me thynketh . . . stande togyther. "This passage introduces the chief issue of this third book of the Testament, whether God's foreknowledge can be reconciled with man's free will. The statement is from St. Anselm, De Conc. Q.I.l, 507b" (Jellech, p. 429). (See Appendix 3.)

239-69 See Conc. 1.1 (Appendix 3, pp. 432-33).

248-49 lyberté of arbetry of arbitrement. Skeat emends silently to liberté of arbitrement. Leyerle emends of to or, which may well be right.

248-50 First, if . . . sothe to understonding. Jellech notes that "this statement follows closely the latter half of St. Anselm's opening sentence of the De Conc. Q. I.l. With some exceptions, this chapter is a close paraphrase of St. Anselm's Chapters 1, 2, and part of 3, of Question 1" (see Appendix 3).

251 repugnaunce. Th: repuguaunce. Emended by all.

253-54 whom foloweth necessité of thinges commyng. Jellech: "The antecedent of whom is prescience; the Latin reads `quam sequi necessitas futurorum rerum videtur'" (p. 432).

255-56 Bothe . . . I admyt. Jellech: "Usk's immediate capitulation to Love's assertion is undramatic and a contradiction of the doubt which he expressed at the end of Chapter 2. Nor does he follow St. Anselm in accepting the two propositions as not contradictory. Since Anselm's argument is rather paradoxical, it may not have been fully understood by Usk. Anselm asserts that there is another impossibility included in the two propositions; i.e., free will assumes something happens without necessity, but since God has foreknowledge and since God's foreknowledge assumes that what God knows is necessarily the future, the paradoxical conclusion is that there is something in the future without necessity by necessity. Anselm did not develop or resolve the issue, but left it open. Usk, however, makes definite the vagueness of his original and consequently is misled" (p. 432).

262 wheder. Th: whedto. Schaar notes that wheder is Skeat's emendation of the corrupt whedto in Thynne's text. "It seems that wheder was substituted for wherof (ergo), and that a negation corresponding to nequaquam should be restored: and wherof, to every wight that hath good understanding, is seen these thinges <in no wise> to be repugnaunt etc. After the second necessité a full stop is required" (p. 36).

267-69 God beforne wote . . . love dedes. Here Usk substitutes his own case of love and destiny for St. Anselm's topics of man's righteousness and sinfulness. See Jellech, p. 433. See also Leyerle, p. 370.

273 so it foloweth. Skeat misreads, so followeth.

273-74 And so . . . and shal be. Jellech suggests that the phrase "without necessity" was "either dropped by the printer or inadvertently omitted by Usk. It is essential for the sense: And so it follows, whether you love or do not love, either case is and shall be without necessity" (p. 434).

276 through. Th: though. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

281 if no love. Skeat emends to if [I] no[t] love; Leyerle, to if [I ne] love.

284-385 See Conc. 1.2 (Appendix 3, pp. 433-35).

289-90 Right so . . . or els none. Jellech: "Just as if I say that you are a lover or else not a lover through necessity" (p. 436).

291-92 whiche shal nat be. Jellech: "That which it will not be" (p. 436).

292 whiche shal be. Jellech: "That which it will be" (p. 436).

292-94 That same thynge . . . any other thing. Jellech: "It is possible that Usk did not understand the Latin construction here and transferred his confusion to the English version. The Latin is, `hoc ipsum namque praescit Deus, qui praevidet aliquid futurum ex sola voluntate, quod voluntas non cogitur, aut prohibetur ulla alia re.' The Latin `qui praevidet' has become which he beforne seeth instead of `who foresees' and no syntactical relationship between any thyng commende and the preceding verb is expressed in the English" (p. 436). See Appendix 3 below, p. 433.

296 inconvenyent. Leyerle emends to inconvenyen[ce].

298-300 Also farthermore . . . it is pronounced. Jellech: "Furthermore, whoever considers properly his understanding of [the word] `prescience,' in the same way that anything is said to be before known, [will realize] it is also pronounced or declared to be coming, or in the future" (p. 437).

302 if I sey if it shal be. Skeat reads: if I sey, it shal be. Leyerle: if I sey,`If it shal be [of necessyté it shal be].'

306-07 the thyng toforne put. In the general murkiness of language here, one key, centered in this phrase, the thyng toforne put, will be of considerable help to the reader. It is the order of the grammar -dyversité in settyng of wordes maketh dyversité in understandynge (lines 313-14). If something is, it is necessary -if loue is put to be it is said of necessyté to be; but necessity does not make it that it is -nat for that necessité constrayneth or defendeth love to be or nat to be. Or, as we find it a few lines later, and it is nat the same to saye, love to be passed, and love passed to be passed (lines 311-12) -i.e., the "setting of the words" is crucial: love passed must be passed.

307 that thyng shal be. Leyerle adds: [of necessite it shal be].

310 commyng to al. Leyerle: commyng to [be] al.

341 And yet. Leyerle emends to: and yet [after it is present].

342 whiche to her, Margarite, thee hath bounde. "which has bound you to her, Margarite." Th reads boude for bounde. Both Skeat and Jellech read bounde.

343 for. Th: ferre. Schaar argues that ferre in Usk's text was miswritten for for, translating St Anselm's quia. "The authentic reading, it can hardly be doubted, should be: `Trewly, som doing of accion nat by necessité is comminge, for toforn it be, it may be that it shal nat be comminge'" (p. 36).

355 right as this terme. Th: Right these termes. Jellech's emendation. Skeat emends: right [so] this terme, linking the clause to the previous sentence, as does Leyerle, who changes this to th[e].

356 that thyng. Skeat emends to that [a] thing.

357 that. Skeat: "that which."

with nothyng. Skeat: "yet not so as to be constrained by anything else" (p. 481).

357-58 foloweth with . . . constrayned. Leyerle emends to: folow[yng], w[hic]h nothyng [constrayneth] to be.

358-417 See Conc. 1.3 (Appendix 3, pp. 435-37).

359-61 Schaar notes, "as has been demonstrated often enough on the preceding pages, words and clauses have frequently dropped out during the copying of the text, and, I think, something has been lost in that way here as well. The passage, it seems, should be thus restored: "For if I say, `tomorowe love is comming in this Margarites herte,' nat therfore thorow necessité shal the ilke love be; yet it may be that <toforn it be,> it shal nat be, although it were comming" (p. 37).

361 that it shal nat be. Leyerle, following Schaar, emends to: that [toforn it be], it shal nat be.

370-71 one is . . . Another is. Leyerle observes that "the distinction . . . is between forgoing necessity . . ., Anselm's praecedens necessitas, which is causative, and folowyng necessite . . ., Anselm's sequens necessitas, which is not" (p. 373).

371 nedeful is. Skeat emends to nedeful [it] is.

375 commynge. Leyerle thinks some portion of the text is probably lost at this point.

389 For why . . . nat be. Schaar finds it more likely that Usk wrote now than that god wol may nat <nat> be, and that one negation was either dropped by haplography [shortened writing] or consciously eliminated by a scribe or printer, unfamiliar with philosophical argument (p. 37). Leyerle follows Schaar and adds the double negative.

400-01 Right so . . . wyl is necessarye. Jellech observes: "There is some corruption here. The Latin construction is very simple: `ita non est peccatum voluntatis necessarium, sicut velle non est necessarium' (see Appendix 3, p. 436). Skeat added `in' before maner, but this is no clarification. I have let the passage stand as is" (p. 448). Leyerle follows Skeat.

402 through. Th: though. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

403-04 right so . . . to wylne. Jellech: "This translation is confusing. It means, as the thing which free will wishes, it also may and may not wish. That is, in order to be free the will must have an option to choose or not to choose, but it is necessary for the will to choose something" (p. 448).

405-06 for impossyble . . . to him. Jellech suggests that "between impossyble, line [405], and to him, line [406], two and a half lines of text have been repeated in Thynne: to him it is one thyng and the same to wylne he may not wylne but thilk to wylne nedeful is: for impossyble to him it is one thyng and the same to wylne he may not wylne but thilk to wylne nedeful is: for impossyble to him it is one thyng and the same to wylne and not to wylne. In addition some equivalent portion of St. Anselm's text in translation has been omitted after he may not wylne, line 404: "antequam velit quia libera est; et cum jam vult, non potest non velle." "Sed eam velle necesse est" follows and the translation is duly included in Thynne. Possibly the similarity between this clause and the clause thilke to wylne nedeful is (line 406) was the source of the errour" (p. 449). Leyerle's emendation of lines 403-06 is as follows: "Right so thilke thynge that fre wyl wol: and [he] maye and not may not wylne, and nedeful is that to wylne. [For he maye not wylne toforne he wol, as wyl is fre, and whan than he wol] he maye [not] not wylne, but thilke to wilne nedeful is [etc.]." Leyerle also calls this passage "a locus desperatus" (p. 376):

. . . Thynne's text is little more than bewildering nonsense. . . . Anselm's De concordia is not easy to understand in itself and Usk's version of it is often baffling unless read beside the original, and sometimes then as well. At line . . . [424] of this chapter the manuscript from which Thynne's text was set had the major displacement of leaves discussed in the Introduction . . .; consequently, any attempt by the printer to get a general sense of the chapter's argument was futile. In view of these circumstances, the corruption of Thynne's text is not surprising. . . . [T]he editor must acknowledge that his proposals are little more than first aid to what must be considered a locus desperatus.

408 and that he wol not. Leyerle emends to and that [it be not, that] he wol not.

or. Th: of. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

409-10 than by wyl . . . togyther be. Jellech: "The phrase than by wyl not constrayned seems to be Usk's explanatory insertion into the argument. The sentence following is hopelessly corrupt. The Latin is, `befariam est necessarium, quia et voluntate cogitur fieri, et quod fit non potest simul non fieri.' In Usk the negation of the final infinitive be is missing; as is the main clause" (p. 449).

413 seeth. Th: syght. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

414-15 al maner thynges ben. Skeat: al maner thinges [that] ben. Leyerle: al, [and] man[y] thynge ben.

415-16 might have ben never they. Skeat: [it] might have ben [that] never they. Leyerle: might have ben, never th[at].

418-19 Hereby . . . lybertie of wyl. Jellech: "There is a mixture of constructions here, of a noun clause dependent on ben knowe, `everything is not from necessity,' and an accusative-infinitive construction, `all things not be from necessity.' Hence, the non-agreement between subject and verb. For, line [419], means `but'" (p. 451).

418-38 See Conc. 1.4 (Appendix 3, p. 437).

424 movable tyme. There is. Here, as do Jellech and Leyerle, I intervene in Thynne's text to re-order it in conformity with the Bradley-Skeat shift, as modified by Bressie (see the Introduction, vi f, "The Problem of the Broken Sequence of Book 3," for extended comment). As a consequence of this intervention, the reader can no longer follow Thynne except by observing the boldface folia numbers in the lower half of the page and skipping across the breaks to connect Thynne's consecutive foliation. I will alert the reader to each break in my notes as well as marking it in the boldface foliation. Finally, I would like to cite Leyerle's important observation that "here the Bradley shift follows the order of [St. Anselm's] De concordia, conclusive proof of the accuracy of the shift at this point" (p. 379). The reader can test this assertion, with which I concur, by checking the relevant passages in Appendix 3 below (p. 437).

432-35 whiche thyng . . . for free arbitrement. Jellech: "This sentence is a straightforward calque [translation by modelling the target language on the original language] on the Latin, with much resultant confusion in the English. However, the Latin is not very coherent either. I would translate St. Anselm:

The conclusion is, if it is not too absurd even to state, either it is not by necessity or it is not anything which God knows or foreknows to be or not to be. Therefore [= Usk and yet] nothing prevents anything from being known or foreknown by him in our wills or from being done in our acts, or from being in the future through free will. (p. 453; see Appendix 3)

442-60 See Conc. 1.4 (Appendix 3, p. 438).

447 first alone. Jellech: "`Alone' in the sense of `solitary' is not suitable here. A substantive derived from OF aloigner, `to move,' may have been the original word, misread or misunderstood by the printer. The OF noun `aloinement,' and the verb "aloinen" entered Middle English" (p. 454). Leyerle offers a very different explanation: "the word commyng, from line [446], is understood after first. Love's point in this discussion is that whether motion is coming or going is a matter of perspective. In its circular motion, the sun in going from a given position is also coming back to it" (p. 380).

462-63 Job . . . passe. Skeat (p. 481) cites Job 14.5: "Constituisti terminos eius, qui praeteriri non poterunt" [thou hast appointed his bounds which cannot be passed].

462-554 See Conc. 1.5 (Appendix 3, pp. 438-39).

464 dying. Th: doyng. Skeat's emendation.

466-67 ne He seeth . . . of necessyté. Jellech: "This sentence is an inaccurate calque on the Latin, `[Deus] dicitur constituisse apud se immutabiliter quod apud hominen priusquam fiat mutari potest.' An English rendering would read:

God is said to have ordained for himself immutably what can be changed amongst men before it happens.

Usk's version loses the contrast between what has been set down as requisite for God and what is the case for man" (p. 456; see Appendix 3). Leyerle, following Schaar, emends nothing wheder to nothing [but the sothe], wheder.

470 conformes. Skeat cites the Vulgate (Romans 8.29, 30): "Nam quos praesciuit, et praedestinauit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui" -For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son (p. 481).

473 magnifyed. Compare Romans 8.30.

475 nowe as mokel . . . wynter. Jellech glosses: "And now a moment is as great as seven thousand winters" (p. 457).

490-92 But right as . . . very knowynge. Jellech: "This is an incomplete and confused rendering of the Latin, which contrasts the temporal present, even when projected to include every place and everything which is in existence anywhere, with the eternal present which contains everything which has ever existed in time, all at once" (p. 458; see Appendix 3). Leyerle solves the problem by emending coveyteth to co[nteyn]eth and both to b[e]th.

499 at the God. Jellech emends to at God and glosses "with God" (p. 459); Leyerle follows Jellech.

502 temporel, without. Skeat places and before the preposition without. Leyerle follows Skeat. Jellech notes that the subject is still al thynges and that "there is nothing in St. Anselm to correspond to this clause''(p. 460).

505 to thy. Leyerle, following Skeat, emends to [in] thy.

507-08 for at thilk . . . thilke seintes. Th: for al thilk . . . thilke sentences. Leyerle's emendation. Skeat reads: for al [at] thilk . . . [of] thilke sentence; Jellech: for al at thilk . . . at thilk sentence.

511 in wordes. Th: worde is. Jellech's emendation, followed by Leyerle. Skeat reads: [in] worde.

520-21 in whiche . . . your actes. Jellech suggests that a key word, true, has been lost here; i.e., . . . "your wylles and your actes true'' (p. 461).

525 nat. Th: no arte. Skeat suggests (p. 482), with a "(?)," the gloss "in no way"; but then he goes on to suggest that ne arte is "surely an error for nat, as writest nat is repeated in line [525]." Jellech and Leyerle follow Skeat's suggestion, as do I.

526 or els wylne to write. Jellech: "Or it is not necessary for you to wish to write" (p. 462).

528-29 for somthyng is . . . it nat be. Jellech: "Apparently nothing more was attempted here by Usk than an approximation of the Latin, but the rendering has become badly confused. The changes which I have made are only those errors which the printer might have made under influence of the surrounding text: `for somthyng is in the everlastynge presence that in temporal tyme it was nat in tyme in eterne presence shal it nat be'" (p. 462). Leyerle (p. 182) emends as follows: For somthynge [is nat in temporal tyme that] is in the everlastynge presence [and somthynge that was] in temporal tyme, it was nat in eternyte, [and somthynge that will be in temporal] tyme, in eterne presence shal it nat be: than no reason defendeth that somthyng [may] be in tyme temporal movyng that in eterne is immovable. Schaar (p.39) would read: For <if> somthing is in the everlastinge presence, than in temporal tyme it was nat; <if it was> in <temporal> tyme, in eterne presence shal it nat be; that is "if anything is in eternity, it was not in time; if it was in time, it shall not be in eternity."

532 immovable. Th: movable. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

535 is in eternyté. Th: is eternyté. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

536 ne. Leyerle, following Skeat, omits.

537-41 A so . . . in his present maner. Jellech: "Skeat drily calls attention to the obscurity of Usk's explanation and the incongruity of Love's enthusiasm for her pupil's perspicuity. Schaar attempted to remedy the apparent defects in Usk's explanation by going back to St. Anselm's work to see what is missing in ours. Schaar did not see the error `deemed' for denied in line [538]. Moreover, Schaar did not realize the extent to which Usk is paraphrasing in these lines, so that his proposed emendations are too extensive to be genuine. I do not believe that emendation is required so much as syntactical expansion of Usk's paraphrase. Of course, access to the Latin treatise (see Appendix 3) is invaluable because at least one knows what he was trying to say. I would read these sentences as follows:

It seems to me that things coming or else past here in your temporal time ought not to be denied to be in eternity ever now and present. And yet it does not follow that anything which was or will be (in time) is not there [in eternity] in any manner, past or else future: we shall completely deny that, because there [in eternity] it is without ceasing in its manner of the present." (p. 464)

Schaar would add it there to be passed or coming between deny and for in line 540, observing that the missing words may easily have been dropped by haplography "since the words there to ben passed or els comming had just before been written" (p. 40).

538 denied. Th: demed. Skeat follows Thynne, but Jellech emends to denied (followed by Leyerle), which makes good sense, presupposing a misreading of three consecutive minims.

540 than. Leyerle emends to tha[t].

541 be able. Th: able. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

542 cloude in unconnyng. Conceivably a verbal echo of the "cloud of unknowing."

547 afore. Th: and for. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

548 For right. Skeat: "for nothing at all exists there (i.e., in eternity) after the manner of that which is temporal" (p. 482).

554 that God al thyng. Th: that al thyng. Skeat and Leyerle add God, as head of the clause; Jellech adheres to Thynne.

554-58 See Conc. 1.7 (Appendix 3, pp. 440-41).

555 ben to ben. Leyerle emends to have beyng. Skeat glosses ben to ben as
"are to come because of God's knowledge" (p. 482).

559-60 the noble philosophical poete in Englissh. Jellech: "Ever since the discovery that Chaucer was not the author of TL . . . this reference has been taken to allude to Chaucer. Skeat makes the interesting point that the metaphysical question of greatest importance in Troilus and Criseyde is not the origin of evil, which is Usk's topic at this point, but predestination. From Usk's reference here to Chaucer as an authority on the origin of evil it would seem that he misread or misunderstood the Troilus" (p. 466). Pace Skeat and Jellech (and Bressie, too), Leyerle argues, correctly, I think, that (p. 387)

Usk's request . . . is for information on two problems: one concerns the problem of evil and the other concerns God's foreknowledge. Love replies by sending him in lines [569-73] back to II.13 and II.14 in the Testament, chapters that contain a discussion of the nature of evil; see, especially, II.13.1ff. . . . The reference to Tr can thus be seen as one to matters about foreknowledge.

560 whiche. Leyerle emends to [spe]che.

565 starieres. Skeat: storiers, gen. pl. of storier, a teller of a story. Leyerle emends to storiers.

569 of two the laste. Jellech suggests chapters 13 and 14 of Book 2.

573 to be. Leyerle, following Skeat: to be [lykned].

577 muste come the spire. Jellech: "The tree allegory describing the lover's growth in steadfastness was foreshadowed at Book 2, chapter 11 [lines 1141-44]. Usk's use of the metaphor of the tree may have been inspired by St. Anselm's lengthy analogy (De Conc. Q.III.6 [see Appendix 3, p. 442]) of the garden of the human heart and the reception of God's word as seed" (p. 469). See below note to lines 806-07.

586 seconde booke. Skeat: Book 2, chapter 11 (lines 1106ff.).

588 setling. Th: setteles. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

591 frendes. Leyerle: f[erdn]es. Schaar emends to feendes (p. 41).

591-93 my wyl maye ben turned . . . Leyerle speculates that "this autobiographical reference would suggest that Book III was not written while Usk was in confinement. There are no references to the prison in the book, except possibly one at III.1 [128], disesely habitation" (pp. 388-89). With this speculation, compare Medcalf who argues, at great length ([1997], pp. 232ff.), for a major change in and resumption of TL between Book 2, toward the end, and Book 3, transpiring perhaps as late as 1387 (p. 234):

Finally, imprisoned by the Lords Appellant, when his new political motive, the king's service, had become the reason why execution for treason was close upon him, he was driven to those profound considerations of value, vocation, commitment, and the analogy between human and divine love which are the intellectual glory of the Testament. The joins and inconsistencies in the book [viz., 3] are unrevised, presumably, because he suffered execution. (p. 237)

If Medcalf is correct in his bold hypothesis -and his arguments are too complicated and subtle for me to paraphrase adequately here -then a great many received opinions about Usk and TL will have to be subjected to fresh examination.

595 hou. Th: thou. Leyerle's emendation. Jellech and Skeat read thou.

596 is thy. Leyerle emends to is [of] thy.

601 deme. Leyerle: de[in]e. This emendation (meaning "disdain to") is perhaps sound, given the trouble the compiler for Usk had in reading sequences of minims. But though it makes clearer sense, it is not absolutely necessary. Moreover, jugement in line 604 lends support to deme.

612 lovynge. Leyerle: l[e]vynge.

613 lykened. Leyerle: ly[nk]ed. Leyerle's emendation picks up the knot metaphor nicely, but lykened makes good sense and ties in with metaphors of similitude, which are also prominent.

613-40 See Conc. 3.11 (Appendix 3, pp. 441-42).

614 wylles. Leyerle: will[e], which is more idiomatic (and probably right) though less quaint, and the plural is repeated in the same line, which Leyerle is likewise obliged to emend.

615 Right as ye han in your body. Leyerle offers the following clarification (p. 390):

Because Usk does not define his terminology clearly, a brief summary of the argument may be helpful. As the body has instruments of use, such as eyes to see and feet to walk, so the soul has its instruments. One instrument of the soul is reason and another is will. Each instrument of the soul has use and also propensities, Anselm's aptitudines, which Usk renders as aptes. Anselm refers to the aptitudines voluntatis, the propensities of the will, by the word affectiones, which Usk renders as affections. Thus the will is an instrument of the soul and can be considered in three ways: it can be referred to simply as the will itself, or by its affections, or by its use.

616 wyttes. The five wits are the five senses. See further Piltz, pp. 204-07.

616, 617 aparte. Leyerle emends to ap[t]e (see note to line 615), which makes sense, but loses the pun on "separate," "appropriate," and "open." Apte is the term in line 622, however, which strengthens Leyerle's case. But his emendation of apetytes to ap[t]es in line 624 is quite unnecessary.

624 apetytes. "Sanderlin has pointed out (p. 71n4) Usk's mistranslation of apetytes for the Latin `aptitudinibus' in the De conc." (Jellech, p. 474).

625 terme of equivocas. Skeat: "terms of like signification, terme being an error for termes. Answering to Lat. uerba aequiuoca, words of like signification" (p. 482). See further Piltz, p. 97.

629 whan ye. Leyerle: whan [ye reason, and eye is instrument of seeing whiche ye usen whan] ye.

632-37 And thus is instrument wyl . . . Leyerle observes that "there are three instances in [these lines] of the past participle affectum rendered as if it were the noun affectio; as a result, Usk's text makes little sense" (pp. 392-93). The reader should consult Anselm's original, Conc., 3.11, in Appendix 3, pp. 441-42 below.

636-37 For affection . . . to wake. Jellech suggests that a person never wants to be sick, or never wants always to be awake (p. 475).

641 purposed. Th: pursosed.

649 use supercedes ne ought. Leyerle: n[o si]ght. Between ye and ne ends the first shift of the text. As Leyerle notes "here, as at 3.4. [424], the shifted text follows the order of De concordia" (p. 395). At this point, Thynne's text must be rearranged again.

660 But utterly . . . ben rewarded. "But in order to be rewarded with grace to get thy desired bliss" (Jellech, p. 477).

672 Schaar inserts <and> before away and grace (p. 42).

683-85 for though . . . unbyde. Schaar: "Obviously, the second sentence is the concrete case in question, illustrated by the metaphor in the first. The clauses in the second sentence must therefore be paralleled in the first, and we must read: I trowe right, for though thy wil out of reson shulde not tourne, thy wil in one reson shulde not onbyde. The meaning seems to be: just as, though drunkenness is forbidden, people need not always be without drink, so, although your will ought not to lose its contact with reason, it need not necessarily be reasonable in one way only, but so as to make you satisfied, provided you remain virtuous" (p. 42). See also T&C 3.715-18:

"In every thyng, I woot, ther lith mesure.
For though a man forbede dronkenesse,
He naught forbet that every creature
Be drynkeles for alwey, as I gesse."

688 Thou might not chaunge. Schaar (p. 43) proposes punctuating here so that thou might not change begins a new sentence: Trewly, that wil and reson shulde be knit togider, was free wil of reson: after tyme thyne herte is assentaunt to them bothe. Thou might not chaunge, but if thou from rule of reson varye.

711 envy. Leyerle: en[em]y.

714 wyners. Skeat notes that the word welked occurs twice in CT VI.738, IV.277; and wiver once, T&C 3.1010. Leyerle follows Skeat's suggestion and emends to wy[v]ers.

722 kynde. Th: kindly. Jellech's emendation, followed by Leyerle.

728 evydence. Th: evydece. Emended by all.

732 som. Th: no. Jellech's emendation, followed by Leyerle.

734-35 Why . . . t'other. Skeat: "Why, as soon as one has sprung up on high, does not the other spring up also?" Here "one" and "the other" seem to refer to "will" and "bliss" (p. 482).

739-40 anon as . . . to receyve. "As soon as that will proffers itself to be shown and revealed, the bliss should hasten to it, to receive the will" (Jellech, p. 484).

742 Great weight on hye onlofte. See Book 1, line 211, and note above.

his. Th: this. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

742-44 The lines echo the eagle's speech in Chaucer's HF, lines 729-56. See also Aristotle's Physics 8.4, but especially Boethius's Cons., 3. pr. 11.95-187.

752 if. Schaar would emend to in (p. 40).

759-75 See Conc. 3.6 (Appendix 3, pp. 442-43).

760-64 but suche . . . in traveyle. Leyerle rearranges the passage as follows: But suche as nought in norisshynge to mannes kynde serven, or els suche as tournen soone unto mannes confusyon in case that therof they ataste, [men might leave, though they were] comen forthe out of the earth by their owne kynde, withouten any mannes cure or any busynesse in traveyle.

761-62 Schaar would insert to between kynde and serven (p. 41).

767 yit. Th: it. Skeat's emendation, followed by Leyerle. Jellech emends to
that.

774 in. Not in Th. Skeat's addition, followed by Leyerle.

787 amended. Th: ameded.

791-93 Certes, such . . . it to rewarde. Jellech: "There is some corruption here. The thought is, that bliss gotten quickly will be rewarded accordingly by brief duration, while bliss obtained slowly and laboriously will endure. At line [791] there was no antecedent for Thynne's hem, which I have emended to him; i.e., bliss" (p. 489).

792 thee wel. Leyerle reads the w[y]l, which may be better. Skeat and Jellech follow Th: the wel, where the may be the definite article rather than a pronoun, with wel as "weal."

793 right can . . . it to rewarde. "Right, or justice, can send such bitterness afterward to even out the reward for merit" (Jellech, p. 489).

797 blysse endelesse. Skeat reads: blysse [ben] endelesse, followed by Leyerle, but not Jellech.

805 wel. Th: wol. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

806-07 Thou hast herde . . . wexyng. Skeat (p. 483) argues, vigorously, that "the idea of this Tree is copied from PPl C.19.4-14." But as the article by Dronke amply demonstrates, there are many other, possibly more proximate sources for the image in TL (see also above, note to line 577). My own position is currently one of suspicion: I can show Usk's familiarity with T&C to a very fine degree; not so his familiarity with PPl -I am therefore still sceptical that he knew Piers, even as I am strongly inclined to believe that even if he did, he was nowhere near being so intimate with it as he was with T&C and Cons./Boece. See further the Introduction, Section iv, "Usk and his Contemporaries."

807 wyse this. Leyerle inserts [is].

826-28 as gledes . . . overleyn. See T&C 2.538-39: "And wel the hotter ben the gledes rede, / That men hem wrien with asshen pale and dede.''

842-43 Voice without . . . in hert. Skeat: "The reference appears to be to Aristotle, De Interpretatione . . . Chapter 1. Voice seems to mean `a word unrelated to a sentence,' i.e., not related to something else as forming part of a sentence" (p. 483). Skeat's opinion, then, is that Usk means the distinction between mere words and propositions, propositions being Aristotle's express subject in Peri hermenias (4; p. 121); only of propositions can one speak of truth or falsity. Hence, Usk continues: ". . . in ful sentence of trewe menyng . . ." (p. 483 -emphasis added). See further Shoaf (1983), pp. 9-11 and Isaac on the fortunes of the Peri hermenias.

852 avoyde. Schaar: "There is nothing here to be avoided, either with or without difficulty, but there is obviously something which it is not easy to wait for: Alas! than, after suche stormes, how hard is it to abyde, til efte wedring and yeres han maked her circute cours al about, er any frute be able to be tasted!'' (p. 43).

866 That, fole. At this point, Thynne's text must be rearranged again.

868 A marchaunt. Compare Chaucer, CT VIII.947-50.

870 on the oke smyte. Skeat (p. 483) rightly compares Chaucer, T&C 2.1380-84, which reads:

"Thenk here-ayeins: whan that the stordy ook,
On which men hakketh ofte, for the nones,
Receyved hath the happy fallying strook,
The greete sweigh doth it come al at ones.''

N.b., the close verbal echoes here in both works: happy, sweigh, come al at ones.

871 falleth the lethy water. Skeat cites Ovid, Ex Ponto 4.10.5.

876-77 my thynketh . . . rewarde for my longe traveyle. The language here reflects perhaps the complaint in BD, lines 36-38: "hit be a sicknesse / That I have suffred this eight yeer; / And yet my boote is never the ner." See Book 1, lines 486-87 where Usk draws upon this same passage. See also lines 879-910, and the idea that reward comes through peace which becomes possible through Margaryte's goodness, an idea similar to Blanche's gracious therapy of the distraught dreamer in BD.

881 your selven sayd. Skeat compares Book 3, chapter 2 (lines 217-21).

890-91 it is not to put to him. "It is not imputed to him" (Jellech, p. 498).

898-99 kyndely drawen homewarde. See BD, lines 1314ff.

899-900 al is holy her to wyte. "It is all to be accounted to her wholly" (Skeat, p. 483). To wyte usually has a bad sense, as implying blame. Hence, Jellech would emend wyte to quyte and construe "her" as "for her" so as to read: "it is entirely for her to repay the love that you have" (p. 499).

910 this lady. I.e., "Heavenly Love suddenly took up its place in his heart." "This of course puts an end to the dialogue, but in Thynne's misarranged print the lady speaks to him again, as if it were out of his heart!" (Skeat, p. 483).

918 lyves. Skeat emends to lynes, i.e., written lines of writing, which he imagines to be imprinted on his understanding (p. 483); see lines 919 and 923-24.

928-43 See Conc. 3.3 (Appendix 3, pp. 443).

928ff. It is no maner doute. . . . Jellech: "The abstraction Love has been substituted for Anselm's example of Justice" (p. 502).

932 wyl wylne. Skeat inserts may between the two words; Leyerle inserts to.

937 nothynge. Th: nothyuge. Leyerle's emendation.

942ff. Schaar: "The last sentence is an interpolation of Usk's own, continuing an argument borrowed from St Anselm . . .. There seems to be a slight corruption . . .. The passage, to all appearances, emphasizes the fact that `will' and `not will' do not go together; thus it is a commentary on the preceding statement that anyone who is not willing may not have `loving' (for this implies free will): Pardé, every conseyt of every resonable creature otherwyse wol not graunte:wil in affirmative with not willing by no way mowe accorde. This continuation shows that Grace added to free will is the way to `loving': And although this loving wol come in myn herte by freenesse of arbitrement, as in this booke fully is shewed, yet owe I not therfore as moche alowe my free wil as grace of that Margaryte to me lened" (p. 44).

943-76 See Conc. 3.4 (Appendix 3, p. 443-44).

950 his owne gylte by fre wyl that leseth. Jellech: "Through his own guilt by free will so that he loses" (p. 504).

953-56 See Conc. 3.5 (Appendix 3, p. 444).

959 Trewly. Th: Trewy; grace. Th: grae.

961 accepted. Leyerle: acc[om]pted on grounds that the term anticipates line 971.

963 consydereth. Skeat emends to considereth [howe] and Leyerle concurs.

968 havynge. Th: havyuge. Leyerle's emendation.

975 so no man to her blysse shal ben folowed. Jellech: "This unclear clause has no counterpart in the Latin. Man is probably an error for `men' -`so no men to their bliss. . . .' Still, shal ben folowed makes no sense; if it were not for the passive, `folowe' might have the meaning `reach or arrive at' (MED 6.c); compare Chaucer, Boece 4. p. 2. 152, where `folowen' means `to attain'" (p. 507).

976-86 See Conc. 3.12 (Appendix 3, p. 445).

981-82 good savour. Skeat cites 2 Corinthians 2.15-16: "Quia Christi bonus odor sumus Deo, in iis qui salui fiunt; . . . aliis quidem odor mortis in mortem" [For we are the good odour of Christ unto God, in them that are saved, . . . to the one indeed the odour of death unto death (but to the others the odour of life unto life)] (p. 484).

986-1051 See Conc. 3.13 (Appendix 3, pp. 445-47).

1003 ne had. Skeat prints had, disregarding ne, which is inserted after the word denyded in line 1002.

herte. Jellech emends to hete (also in line 1004); followed by Leyerle.

1009 God. Th: good. Skeat's emendation, followed by Leyerle.

1014 God. Not in Th. Skeat's addition, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

1015 thylke two. Leyerle identifies the two through emendation: [wylles, or affections], which he places after two.1024-25 fyl man unto lykenesse of unreasonable bestes. On "unlikeness" to God (i.e., likeness to beasts) as punishment for the Fall, see Shoaf (1983), p. 250n4 and the sources cited there. The idea finds particularly vivid expression in St. Augustine's Confessions (7.10; p. 147) as the "regio dissimilitudinis," or "land of unlikeness"; see also his commentary on Psalm 95 (Expositions 4, pp. 383-85).

1026ff. But yet wyl of blysse . . . Leyerle argues at length (pp. 410-12) that

this passage is an account of why Usk withdrew his support from Northampton and appealed him for treason presented in terms of Anselm's discussion of free will, justice and grace. . . The point is clear enough in outline, if not in the veiled statement in the Testament. Usk presents his appeal of Northampton for treason as a return by means of grace received from the Margarite perle to the full freedom of his will, that is, of his capacity to leave off injustice and bestyal appetytes and chose [sic] justice. To explain this political shift of allegiance in terms of Anselm's theological philosophy is an unusual and remarkably sophisticated argument without parallel in Middle English literature.

1028-29 in his owne comodyté. "in what is suitable for him." Skeat defines comodites as "desires that are suitable" (p. 484). Leyerle says that "comodytees means `advantages'" (p. 410).

1029 where. Th: were. Skeat's emendation, followed by Leyerle. Jellech emends to trewe.

1034 And frenesse of arbytrement. Jellech: "There is some corruption here. The Latin translates `man cannot wish for uprightness through free choice when he does not have uprightness, however much he was powerful to keep uprightness when he did have it'" (p. 513). See Appendix 3.

1036 Wyl of commodyté. Jellech: "That aspect of the will which is the instrument or means for desiring satisfactory things" (p. 513).

1048 flesh. Th: flyes. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

1050 their. Th: they. Leyerle's emendation; he cites the their in [line 1051] as proof of the emendation's validity.

1052-54 See Conc. 3.14 (Appendix 3, p. 447).

1056-68 See Conc. 2.2 (Appendix 3, p. 448).

1057 badnesse. Th: hadnest. Schaar's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle. Skeat emends to hath desteness.

1057-59 Schaar: "Usk's argument is here very obscure, and it would be useless to try and get complete sense and coherence out of it, the obscurity being doubtless mainly due to the author's own confusion. The reason why he has been led astray seems to be his attempt to combine some reflections on Grace and destiny with a remark of St. Anselm's that predestination is true not only of good things, but of evil things as well. . . . Usk's conjunctions, then, are the chief cause of the incoherence in his passage. There are, however, other weak points in it, but for these it is less probable that Usk should be blamed. . . . the correct reading seems to be `god badnesse made' etc. It seems more probable, further, that missayth (Thynne: missaythe) is a copyist's error than a mistranslation of emollit; but it is difficult to suggest a convincing emendation of this detail of Usk's passage. In Thynne mis is printed at the end of one line, saythe at the beginning of the next, and it is possible that some letters are missing. Perhaps the author wrote mis allayth, `puts an end to wrong-doing,' a paraphrase of (hominem) emollit" (p. 45).

1059 missaythe. Schaar emends to mis allayeth; Leyerle emends to [ne]iss[h]ythe, "softens." Leyerle's emendation depends on Conc. 2.2 (See Appendix 3, pp. 447-48).

into temptacion. The reference is to Romans 9.18.

1062 leneth. Th: leveth. Skeat's emendation, followed by Jellech and Leyerle.

1066 chapitre. Skeat suggests Book 3, chapter 3 (p. 484).

1068-78 See Conc. 2.3 (Appendix 3, pp. 448-49).

1073 falleth, fre wyl. Skeat emends to falleth [through] fre wyl; Leyerle supplies fro as the medial word. I punctuate, however, to recognize Usk's loose ablative absolute construction.

1077-78 Schaar: "Skeat's additions do not agree with the statement that both actions were done out of free will; no emendation seems necessary, and for if that with free wil there had it not willed, neyther had wrought that he perfourmed is a literal and awkward translation of St Anselm's `quia si non sponte voluisset, neuter quod fecit fecisset'" (p. 44).

1080 seyntes. Th: sentence. Jellech's emendation, followed by Leyerle.

1085 and the grettest. At this point, Thynne's text must be rearranged one final time.

1090 pamflet. Leyerle (p. 415):

A pamflet is a small treatise occupying fewer pages than would make a book. The word is, apparently, a generalized use of Pamphilet, a familiar name of a twelfth-century Latin amatory poem Pamphilus seu de amore. Usk's use is the first in English, and it may have a sense still connected with its source: "a short work about love."

1098 of. Not in Th. Supplied by Skeat and Leyerle.

1115 booke amender. A request for prayers and for the reader's indulgence was a conventional conclusion of the medieval writer. See C.S. Lewis (1964), p. 195.

1125-26 spyrite that yeveth lyfe. Compare John 6.63.

1127 The letter sleeth. See 2 Corinthians 3.6.

1128-29 God graunt us . . . . Skeat: "Printed as prose in Thynne; but two riming verses seem to be intended. If so, al-le is dissyllabic" (p. 484).