Thomas Usk, The Testament of Love: Appendix 3

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Thomas Usk, The Testament of Love: Appendix 3

by: Thomas Usk (Author), R. Allen Shoaf (Editor)
from: The Testament of Love  1998

St. Anselm's De Concordia
(Sections Relevant to TL)


Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made to the Edwin Mellen Press for permission to reprint sections from De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio from Anselm of Canterbury, Complete Treatises, edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Lewiston: New York, 1974-76), II (1976), 181-223.

In some ways, this Appendix is bound to be misleading. Like the others, it is designed to provide information. However, the information it provides is a translation of a major Latin work of the early Middle Ages (St. Anselm died in 1109 CE). If Appendix 1 also contains translations from Latin, these, being translations of different versions of the same lapidary lore, are by their nature utilitarian and thus no imminent threat to deleteriously replace the topic to hand. But Anselm's De Concordia is a major philosophical/theological work which deserves attention in its own right in its original Latin. Hence the translation here can promote a false sense of security which I hope to have dispelled by these remarks.The translations quoted here should not, of course, be understood to be a substitute for the Latin text with which Usk worked.

To prepare this Appendix, I have in the main followed Sanderlin, having checked his work and found it generally reliable. However, I do not reproduce all of his arguments. The information he provides on Usk's manipulations of De Concordia, as distinct from the principal translations, I have included primarily in my notes in abbreviated form at the relevant site in TL. I do want, though, to quote his summary (pp. 70 and 72) of Usk's major changes to De Concordia and his analyses of Usk's procedure with the text:

. . . Usk changes this term rectitude [a key term of St. Anselm's argument], meaning the end assigned to free choice, to the word love, meaning an act of the will and referring especially to his own will's love of the Margaret. Similarly, he substitutes "lovinge wil" for "recta voluntas," with the same purpose of adapting St. Anselm's discussion to his own allegory of the Margaret. . . . [He turns] St. Anselm's treatise into dialogue form by assigning to himself in the Testament the objections and counter arguments that are given in the De concordia, leaving the positive teaching to be spoken by Love. . . . [The disorder in Book 3] is caused by the substitution of the term love for rectitude; by the patchwork character of the translation with clumsy or non-existent transitions; by the limitations of the English philosophical vocabulary of the fourteenth century.
With this position, compare that of Medcalf (pp. 188-90), for whom, recall, TL is "the first book of original philosophy in English" (Introduction, note 17):
. . . the study of Usk as a translator of Anselm at the level of word correspondence will remain particular and perilous. . . . conformity to Anselm is no guide. . . . This would suggest a rule that you may emend our text of Usk to follow Anselm more literally unless where it seems that Usk would want to make the text more conversational or to make it refer to love.
It is not my concern here to test this "rule" -- although I will say that it "feels" right to me (the reader will already have seen that I find Usk frequently inventive in unpredictable ways). Still, I urge the reader, even if Medcalf's warm defense of Usk seems disputable, to keep his "rule" in mind, if only as a check against premature conclusions.

Sanderlin's analysis shows that Usk uses some 45% of De Concordia. My own rough statistics show that this 45% amounts to slightly more than the same percentage of TL 3. (TL 3 [containing 17,653 words] is only slightly shorter than De Concordia [containing 18,301]). Obviously, then, the relationship is extensive and ideally should receive detailed separate study. My sense of the matter is that Usk sometimes follows St. Anselm quite closely, but that at other times he is independent if not inventive. On balance, I admire his effort. De Concordia is not an "easy" text. Moreover, it is often densely figurative -- Anselm develops an image of the seed as word and word as seed (De Concordia 3.6) as complex and provocative in its context as Dante's is in its (Inferno 33.7ff.). Usk may occasionally appropriate the figuration -- for example, his tree image is probably borrowed from St. Anselm (see the notes to Book 3, lines 577 and 806-07) -- but he is always involved in appropriating St. Anselm's arguments to his purposes. What I mainly wish to do here with this observation and these very brief comments is prepare readers to understand TL 3 a bit more easily than would otherwise be possible and urge them at the same time to practice an adequate scepticism toward any premature conclusions about TL and De Concordia.

To follow the list, use the line numbers of Book 3, at the left, to find Usk's version of the passage from De Concordia. Conversely, in the notes I list the passage from De Concordia and the page numbers in the Appendix. I include the page numbers of the Hopkins-Richardson translation in bold-face parentheses in case readers wish to consult it. I provide no more of the Latin than what is included by Hopkins and Richardson, and I do not annotate De Concordia at all.

De Concordia 1.1 (pp. 181-83)
Compare TL, lines 239-69

(181) Admittedly, free choice and the foreknowledge of God seem incompatible; for it is necessary that the things foreknown by God be going to occur, whereas the things done by free choice occur without any necessity. Now, if these two are incompatible, then it is impossible that God's all-foreseeing foreknowledge should coexist with something's being done by freedom of choice. In turn, if this impossibility is regarded as not obtaining, then the incompatibility which seems to be present is completely eliminated.

Therefore, let us posit as existing together both God's foreknowledge (from which the necessity of future things seems to follow) and freedom of choice (by which many actions are performed, we believe, without any necessity); and let us see whether it is impossible for these two to coexist. If this coexist- (182) ence is impossible, then some other impossibility arises from it. For, indeed, an impossible thing is one from which, when posited, some other impossible thing follows. Now, on the assumption that some action is going to occur without necessity, God foreknows this, since he foreknows all future events. And that which is foreknown by God is, necessarily, going to occur, as is foreknown. Therefore, it is necessary that something be going to occur without necessity. Hence, the foreknowledge from which necessity follows and the freedom of choice from which necessity is absent are here seen (for one who rightly understands it) to be not at all incompatible. For, on the one hand, it is necessary that what is foreknown by God be going to occur; and, on the other hand, God foreknows that something is going to occur without any necessity.

But you will say to me: "You still do not remove from me the necessity of sinning or the necessity of not sinning. For God foreknows that I am going to sin or foreknows that I am not going to sin. And so, if I sin, it is necessary that I sin; or if I do not sin, it is necessary that I do not sin." To this claim I reply: You ought to say not merely "God foreknows that I am going to sin" or "God foreknows that I am not going to sin" but "God foreknows that it is without necessity that I am going to sin" or "God foreknows that it is without necessity that I am not going to sin." And thus it follows that whether you sin or do not sin, in either case it will be without necessity; for God foreknows that what will occur will occur without necessity. Do you see, then, that it is not impossible for God's foreknowledge (according to which future things, which God foreknows, are said to occur of necessity) to coexist with freedom of choice (by which many actions are performed without necessity)? For if this coexistence were impossible, then something impossible would follow. But no impossibility arises from this coexistence.

Perhaps you will claim: "You still do not remove the constraint of necessity from my heart when you say that, because of God's foreknowledge, it is necessary for me to be going to sin without necessity or it is necessary for me to be not going to sin without necessity. For necessity seems to imply coercion or restraint. Therefore, if it is necessary that I sin willingly, I interpret this as indicating that I am compelled by some hidden power to will to sin; and if I do not sin, [I interpret this as indicating that] I (183) am restrained from willing to sin. Therefore, it seems to me that if I sin I sin by necessity, and if I do not sin it is by necessity that I do not sin."

De Concordia 1.2 (pp. 183-85)
Compare TL, lines 284-358

(183) And I [reply]: We must realize that we often say "necessary to be" of what is not compelled-to-be by any force, and "necessary not to be" of what is not excluded by any preventing factor. For example, we say "It is necessary for God to be immortal" and "It is necessary for God not to be unjust." [We say this] not because some force compels Him to be immortal or prohibits Him from being unjust, but because nothing can cause Him not to be immortal or can cause Him to be unjust. Similarly, then, I might say: "It is necessary that you are going to sin voluntarily" or "It is necessary that, voluntarily, you are not going to sin" -- just as God foreknows. But these statements must not be construed to mean that something prevents the act of will which shall not occur, or compels that act of will which shall occur. For God, who foresees that some action is going to occur voluntarily, foreknows the very fact that the will is neither compelled nor prevented by anything. Hence, what is done voluntarily is done freely. Therefore, if these matters are carefully pondered, I think that no inconsistency prevents freedom of choice and God's foreknowledge from coexisting.

Indeed, (if someone properly considers the meaning of the word), by the very fact that something is said to be foreknown, it is declared to be going to occur. For only what is going to occur is foreknown, since knowledge is only of the truth. Therefore, when I say "If God foreknows something, it is necessary that this thing be going to occur," it is as if I were to say: "If this thing will occur, of necessity it will occur." But this necessity neither compels nor prevents a thing's existence or nonexistence. For because the thing is presumed to exist, it is said to exist of necessity; or because it is presumed not to exist, it is said to not-exist of necessity. [But our reason for saying these things is] not that necessity compels or prevents the thing's existence or nonexistence. For when I say "If it will occur, of necessity it will occur," here the necessity follows, rather than precedes, the presumed existence of the thing. The sense is the same if we say "What will be, of necessity will be." For this necessity signifies (184) nothing other than that what will occur will not be able not to occur at the same time.

Likewise, the following statements are equally true: (1) that some thing did exist and does exist and will exist, but not out of necessity, and (2) that all that was, necessarily was, all that is, necessarily is, and all that will be, necessarily will be. Indeed, for a thing to be past is not the same as for a past thing to be past; and for a thing to be present is not the same as for a present thing to be present; and for a thing to be future is not the same as for a future thing to be future. By comparison, for a thing to be white is not the same as for a white thing to be white. For example, a staff is not always necessarily white, because at some time before it became white it was able not to become white; and after it has become white, it is able to become not-white. But it is necessary that a white staff always be white. For neither before a white thing was white nor after it has become white can it happen that a white thing is not-white at the same time. Similarly, it is not by necessity that a thing is temporally present. For before the thing was present, it was able to happen that it would not be present; and after it has become present, it can happen that it not remain present. But it is necessary that a present thing always be present, because neither before it is present nor after it has become present is a present thing able to be not-present at the same time. In the same way, some event -- e.g., an action -- is going to occur without necessity, because before the action occurs, it can happen that it not be going to occur. On the other hand, it is necessary that a future event be future, because what is future is not able at the same time to be not-future. Of the past it is similarly true (1) that some event is not necessarily past, because before it occurred, there was the possibility of its not occurring, and (2) that, necessarily, what is past is always past, since it is not able at the same time not to be past. Now, a past event has a characteristic which a present event or a future event does not have. For it is never possible for a past event to become not-past, as a present event is able to become not-present, and as an event which is not necessarily going to happen has the possibility of not happening in the future. Thus, when we say of what is going to happen that it is going to happen, this statement must be true, because it is never the case that what is going to happen is not going to happen. (185) (Similarly, whenever we predicate something of itself, [the statement is true]. For when we say "Every man is a man," or "If he is a man, he is a man," or "Every white thing is white," or "If it is a white thing, it is white": these statements must be true because something cannot both be and not be the case at the same time.) Indeed, if it were not necessary that everything which is going to happen were going to happen, then something which is going to happen would not be going to happen -- a contradiction. Therefore, necessarily, everything which is going to happen is going to happen; and if it is going to happen, it is going to happen. (For we are saying of what is going to happen that it is going to happen.) But ["necessarily" here signifies] subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to be.

De Concordia 1.3 (pp. 185-87)
Compare TL, lines 358-417

(185) However, when an event is said to be going to occur, it is not always the case that the event occurs by necessity, even though it is going to occur. For example, if I say "Tomorrow there will be an insurrection among the people," it is not the case that the insurrection will occur by necessity. For before it occurs, it is possible that it not occur even if it is going to occur. On the other hand, it is sometimes the case that the thing which is said to be going to occur does occur by necessity -- for example, if I say that tomorrow there will be a sunrise. Therefore, if of an event which is going to occur I state that it must be going to occur, [I do so] either in the way that the insurrection which is going to occur tomorrow is, necessarily, going to occur, or else in the way that the sunrise which is going to occur tomorrow is going to occur by necessity. Indeed, the insurrection (which will occur but not by necessity) is said necessarily to be going to occur -- but only in the sense of subsequent necessity. For we are saying of what is going to happen that it is going to happen. For if the insurrection is going to occur tomorrow, then -- necessarily -- it is going to occur. On the other hand, the sunrise is understood to be going to occur with two necessities: (1) with a preceding necessity, which causes the event to occur (for the event will occur because it is necessary that it occur), and (2) with a subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to occur (for because the sunrise is going to occur, it is -- necessarily -- going to occur).

(186) Therefore, when of what God foreknows to be going to occur we say that it is necessary that it be going to occur, we are not in every case asserting that the event is going to occur by necessity; rather, we are asserting that an event which is going to occur is, necessarily, going to occur. For something which is going to occur cannot at the same time be not going to occur. The meaning is the same when we say "If God foreknows such-and-such an event" -- without adding "which is going to occur." For in the verb "to foreknow" the notion of future occurrence is included, since to foreknow is nothing other than to know the future; and so if God foreknows some event, it is necessary that this event be going to occur. Therefore, from the fact of God's foreknowledge it does not in every case follow that an event is going to occur by necessity. For although God foreknows all future events, He does not foreknow that all of them are going to occur by necessity. Rather, He foreknows that some of them will occur as the result of the free will of a rational creature.

Indeed, we must note that just as it is not necessary for God to will what He does will, so in many cases it is not necessary for a man to will what he does will. And just as whatever God wills must occur, so what a man wills must occur -- in the case, that is, of the things which God so subordinates to the human will that if it wills them they occur and if it does not will them they do not occur. For since what God wills is not able not to occur: when He wills for no necessity either to compel the human will to will or to prevent it from willing, and when He wills that the effect follow from the act of human willing, it is necessary that the human will be free and that there occur what it wills. In this respect, then, it is true that the sinful deed which a man wills to do occurs by necessity, even though the man does not will it by necessity. Now, with respect to the human will's sin when it wills to sin: if someone asks whether this sin occurs by necessity, then he must be told that just as the will does not will by necessity, so the will's sin does not occur by necessity. Nor does the human will act by necessity; for if it did not will freely, it would not act -- even though what it wills must come to pass, as I have just said. For since, in the present case, to sin is nothing other than to will what ought not [to be willed]: just as willing is not necessary, so sinful willing is not necessary. Nevertheless, it is true that if a man wills to sin, it is (187) necessary that he sin -- in terms, that is, of that necessity which (as I have said) neither compels nor prevents anything.

Thus, on the one hand, free will is able to keep from willing what it wills; and, on the other hand, it is not able to keep from willing what it wills -- rather, it is necessary for free will to will what it wills. For, indeed, before it wills, it is able to keep from willing, because it is free. And while it wills, it is not able not to will; rather, it is necessary that it will, since it is impossible for it to will and not to will the same thing at the same time. Now, it is the will's prerogative that what it wills occurs and that what it does not will does not occur. And the will's deeds are voluntary and free because they are done by a free will. But these deeds are necessary in two respects: (1) because the will compels them to be done, and (2) because what is being done cannot at the same time not be done. But these two necessities are produced by freedom-of-will; and the free will is able to avoid them before they occur. Now, God (who knows all truth and only truth) sees all these things as they are -- whether they be free or necessary; and as He sees them, so they are. In this way, then, and without any inconsistency, it is evident both that God foreknows all things and that many things are done by free will. And before these things occur it is possible that they never occur. Nevertheless, in a certain sense they occur necessarily, and this necessity (as I said) derives from free will.

De Concordia 1.4 (pp. 187-88)
Compare TL, lines 418-38

(187) Moreover, that not everything foreknown by God occurs of necessity but that some events occur as the result of freedom-of-will can be recognized from the following consideration. When God wills or causes something, He cannot be denied to know what He wills and causes, and to foreknow what He shall will and shall cause. ( [It makes no difference here] whether we speak in accordance with eternity's immutable present, in which there is nothing past or future, but in which all things exist at once without any change (e.g., if we say only that He wills and causes something, and deny that He has willed or has caused and shall will or shall cause something), or whether we speak in accordance with temporality (as when we state that He shall will or shall cause that which we know has not yet occurred).) Therefore, if (188) God's knowledge or foreknowledge imposes necessity on everything He knows or foreknows, then He does not freely will or cause anything (either in accordance with eternity or in accordance with a temporal mode); rather, He wills and causes everything by necessity.

Now, if this conclusion is absurd even to suppose, then it is not the case that everything known or foreknown to be or not to be occurs or fails to occur by necessity. Therefore, nothing prevents God's knowing or foreknowing that in our wills and actions something occurs or will occur by free choice. Thus, although it is necessary that what He knows or foreknows, occur, nevertheless many events occur not by necessity but by free will -- as I have shown above.

De Concordia 1.4 (p. 188)
Compare TL, lines 442-60

(188) Indeed, why is it strange if in this way something occurs both freely and necessarily? For there are many things which admit of opposite characteristics in different respects. Indeed, what is more opposed than coming and going? Nevertheless, when someone moves from one place to another, we see that his movement is both a coming and a going. For he goes away from one place and comes toward another. Likewise, if we consider the sun at some point in the heavens, as it is hastening toward this same point while always illuminating the heavens: we see that the point to which it is coming is the same point from which it is going away; and it is constantly and simultaneously approaching the point from which it is departing. Moreover, to those who know the sun's course, it is evident that in relation to the heavens, the sun always moves from the western sector to the eastern sector; but in relation to the earth, it always moves only from east to west. Thus, the sun always moves both counter to the firmament and -- although more slowly [than the firmament] -- with the firmament. This same phenomenon is witnessed in the case of all the planets. So then, no inconsistency arises if (in accordance with the considerations just presented) we assert of one and the same event (1) that, necessarily, it is going to occur (simply because it is going to occur) and (2) that it is not compelled to be going to occur by any necessity -- except for the necessity which (as I said above) derives from free will.

De Concordia 1.5 (pp. 188-91)
Compare TL, lines 462-554

(188) Now, Job says to God with reference to man: "You have established his end, which cannot be escaped." On the basis of (189) this verse someone might want to prove -- in spite of the fact that sometimes someone does seem to us to cause his own death by his own free will -- that no one has been able to hasten or delay the day of his death. But his objection would not tell against that which I have argued above. For since God is not deceived and sees only the truth -- whether it issues from freedom or from necessity -- He is said to have established immutably with respect to Himself something which, with respect to man, can be altered before it is done. This is also what the Apostle Paul says about those who, in accordance with [God's] purpose, are called to be saints: "Whom He foreknew He predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, so that His Son would be the firstborn among many brethren. And whom He predestined, these He also called. And whom He called, these He also justified. And whom He justified, these He also glorified." Indeed, within eternity (in which there is no past or future but is only a present) this purpose, in accordance with which they have been called to be saints, is immutable. But in these men this purpose is at some time mutable because of freedom of choice. For within eternity a thing has no past or future but only a present; and yet, without inconsistency, in the dimension of time this thing was and will be. Similarly, that which within eternity is not able to be changed is proved to be, without inconsistency, changeable by free will at some point in time before it occurs. However, although within eternity there is only a present, nonetheless it is not the temporal present, as is ours, but is an eternal present in which the whole of time is contained. For, indeed, just as present time encompasses every place and whatever is in any place, so in the eternal present the whole of time is encompassed at once, as well as whatever occurs at any time. Therefore, when the apostle says that God foreknew, predestined, called, justified, and glorified His saints, none of these actions is earlier or later for God; rather everything must be understood to exist at once in an eternal present. For eternity has its own "simultaneity" wherein exist all things that occur at the same time and place and that occur at different times and places.

But in order to show that he was not using these verbs in their temporal sense, the same apostle spoke in the past tense of even those events which are future. For, temporally speaking, God had not already called, justified, and glorified those who He fore- (190) knew were still to be born. Thus, we can recognize that for lack of a verb [properly] signifying the eternal present, the apostle used verbs of past tense; for things which are temporally past are altogether immutable, after the fashion of the eternal present. Indeed, in this respect, things which are temporally past resemble the eternal present more than do things which are temporally present. For eternally present things are never able not to be present, just as temporally past things are never able not to be past. But all temporally present things which pass away do become not-present.

In this manner, then, whenever Sacred Scripture speaks as if things done by free choice were necessary, it speaks in accordance with eternity, in which is present immutably all truth and only truth. Scripture is not speaking in accordance with the temporal order, wherein our volitions and actions do not exist forever. Moreover, just as when our volitions and actions do not exist, it is not necessary that they exist, so it is often not necessary that they ever exist. For example, it is not the case that I am always writing or that I always will to write. And just as when I am not writing or do not will to write, it is not necessary that I write or will to write, so it is not at all necessary that I ever write or will to write.

A thing is known to exist in time so differently from the way it exists in eternity that at some point the following statements are true: (1) in time something is not present which is present in eternity; (2) in time something is past which is not past in eternity; (3) in time something is future which is not future in eternity. Similarly, then, it is seen to be impossible to be denied, in any respect, that in the temporal order something is mutable which is immutable in eternity. Indeed, being mutable in time and being immutable in eternity are no more opposed than are not existing at some time and always existing in eternity -- or than are existing in the past or future according to the temporal order and not existing in the past or future in eternity.

For, indeed, the point I am making is not that something which always exists in eternity never exists in time, but is only that there is some time or other at which it does not exist. For example, I am not saying that my action of tomorrow at no time exists; I am merely denying that it exists today, even though it always exists in eternity. And when we deny that something which is past or (191) future in the temporal order is past or future in eternity, we do not maintain that that which is past or future does not in any way exist in eternity; instead, we are simply saying that what exists there unceasingly in its eternal-present mode does not exist there in the past or future mode. In these cases no contradiction is seen to raise an obstruction. Thus, without doubt and without any contradiction, a thing is said to be mutable in time, prior to its occurrence, although it exists immutably in eternity. [In eternity] there is no time before it exists or after it exists; instead, it exists unceasingly, because in eternity nothing exists temporally. For there exists there, eternally, the fact that temporally something both exists and -- before it exists -- is able not to exist (as I have said). It seems to me to be sufficiently clear from what has been said that free choice and God's foreknowledge are not at all inconsistent with each other. Their consistency results from the nature of eternity, which encompasses the whole of time and whatever occurs at any time.

De Concordia 1.7 (p. 193)
Compare TL, lines 554-58

(193) Since God is believed to foreknow or know all things, we are now left to consider whether His knowledge derives from things or whether things derive their existence from His knowledge. For if God derives His knowledge from things, it follows that they exist prior to His knowledge and hence do not derive their existence from Him; for they can only exist from Him in accordance with His knowledge. On the other hand, if all existing things derive their existence from God's knowledge, God is the creator and the author of evil works and hence is unjust in punishing evil creatures -- a view we do not accept.

De Concordia 3.11 (pp. 214-16)
Compare TL, lines 613-59

(214) But since this last consideration concerns the will, I deem it necessary to say in more detail about the will something which shall not be useless, it seems to me. In our bodies we have five senses and [various] members, each of which, distinctly, is adapted for its own special function. We use these members and (215) senses as instruments. For example, the hands are suited for grasping, the feet for walking, the tongue for speaking, and sight for seeing. Similarly, the soul too has in itself certain powers which it uses as instruments for appropriate functions. For in the soul there is reason, which the soul uses (as its instrument) for reasoning; and there is will, which the soul uses for willing. Neither reason nor will is the whole of the soul; rather, each of them is something within the soul. Therefore, since the distinct instruments have their essence, their aptitudes, and their uses, let us distinguish in the will -- in regard to which we are discussing these matters -- the instrument, its aptitudes, and its uses. In regard to the will we can call these aptitudes inclinations (affectiones). Indeed, the instrument-for-willing is modified by its own inclinations. Hence, when a man's soul strongly wills something, it is said to be inclined to will that thing, or to will it affectionally.

Assuredly, the will is seen to be spoken of equivocally -- in three senses. For (a) the instrument-for-willing, (b) the inclination of this instrument, and (c) the use of this instrument, are distinguishable. The instrument-for-willing is that power-of-the-soul which we use for willing -- just as reason is the instrument-for-reasoning, which we use when we reason, and just as sight is the instrument-for-seeing, which we use when we see. The inclination (affectio) of the instrument-for-willing is that by which the instrument is so inclined to will some given thing (even when a man is not thinking of that which he wills) that if this thing comes to mind, then the will wills [to have] it either immediately or at the appropriate time. For example, the instrument-for-willing is so inclined to will health (even when a man is not thinking of it) that as soon as health comes to mind, the will wills [to have] it immediately. And the instrument-for-willing is so inclined to will sleep (even when a man is not thinking of this) that when it comes to mind, the will wills [to have] it at the appropriate time. For the will is never inclined in such way that it ever wills sickness or that it wills never to sleep. Likewise, in a just man the instrument-for-willing is so inclined to will justice (even when a man is asleep) that when he thinks of justice he wills [to have] it immediately.

On the other hand, the use of this instrument is something which we have only when we are thinking of the thing which we will.

(216) Now, the word "will" applies to the instrument-for-willing, to the inclination of this instrument, and to the use of this instrument. (1) Indeed, we call the instrument will when we say that we direct the will toward various things (e.g., now toward willing to walk, now toward willing to sit, now toward willing something else). A man always possesses this instrument even though he does not always use it. The case is similar to his having sight, in the sense of the instrument-for-seeing, even when he does not use it (e.g., when he is asleep). But when he does use it, he directs it now toward seeing the sky, now toward seeing the earth, now toward seeing something else. Moreover, the case is similar to our always possessing the instrument-for-reasoning, viz., reason, which we do not always use and which, in reasoning, we direct toward various things. (2) But the inclination of the instrument-for-willing is called will when we say that a man always possesses the will for his own well-being. For in this case we label as will that inclination (of the instrument) by which a man wills his own well-being. [The same thing is true] when in this way we say that a saint -- even when he is sleeping and is not thinking about living justly -- continually has the will to live justly. Moreover, when we say that one person has more of the will to live justly than another person, the only thing we are calling will is the instrument's inclination, by which a man wills to live justly. For the instrument itself is not greater in one person and less in another.

De Concordia 3.6 (p. 206)
Compare TL, lines 759-75

Without any cultivation on man's part the earth produces countless herbs and trees by which human beings are not nourished or by which they are even killed. But those herbs and trees which are especially necessary to us for nourishing our lives are not produced by the earth apart from seeds and great labor and a farmer. Similarly, without learning and endeavor human hearts freely germinate, so to speak, thoughts and volitions which are not conducive to salvation or which are even harmful thereto. But without their own kind of seed and without laborious cultivation human hearts do not at all conceive and germinate those thoughts and volitions without which we do not make progress toward our soul's salvation. Hence, those men upon whom such caretaking is bestowed the apostle calls "God's husbandry." Now, the word of God constitutes the seed of this husbandry . . .

De Concordia 3.3 (pp. 201-02)
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(201) Assuredly, there is no doubt that the will wills rightly only because it is upright. For just as sight is not acute because it sees acutely but sees acutely because it is acute, so the will is not upright because it wills rightly but wills rightly because it is upright. Now, when it wills uprightness-of-will, then without doubt it wills rightly. Therefore, it wills uprightness only because it is upright. But for the will to be upright is the same as for it to have uprightness. Therefore, it is evident that it wills uprightness only because it has uprightness. I do not deny that an upright will wills an uprightness which it does not have when it wills more uprightness than it already has. But I maintain that the will is not (202) able to will any uprightness unless it has the uprightness by which to will uprightness.

Let us now consider whether someone who does not have uprightness-of-will can in some way have it from himself. Surely, he could have it from himself only by willing it or without willing it. But, indeed, it is not the case that by willing it someone is able to obtain it by his own efforts, because he is able to will it only if he has it. On the other hand, no one's mind accepts the view that someone who does not have uprightness-of-will can acquire it by himself without willing it. Therefore, a creature can in no way have uprightness from himself. But neither can one creature have it from another creature. For just as one creature cannot save another creature, so one creature cannot give to another creature the necessary means for salvation. Thus, it follows that only by the grace of God does a creature have the uprightness which I have called uprightness-of-will.

De Concordia 3.4 (pp. 203-04)
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(203) Assuredly, even though uprightness is kept by free choice, still its being kept must be imputed not so much to free choice as to grace; for free choice possesses and keeps uprightness only by means of prevenient and of subsequent grace.

However, grace so follows its own gift that the only time grace ever fails to bestow this gift -- whether it is something large or something small -- is when free choice by willing something else forsakes the uprightness it has received. For this uprightness is never separated from the will except when the will wills something else which is incompatible with this uprightness -- as when someone receives the uprightness of willing sobriety and rejects it by willing the immoderate pleasure of drinking. When a man does this, it is by his own will; and so, through his own fault he loses the grace which he received. For when free choice is under attack to abandon the uprightness it has received, grace even assists free choice -- either by mitigating the assailing temptation's appeal, or by completely eliminating its appeal, or by increasing free choice's affection for uprightness. In fact, since everything is subject to the ordinance of God, all of what happens to a man which assists free choice to receive or to keep this uprightness of which I am speaking must be imputed to grace.

I have said that all justice is uprightness-of-will kept for its own sake. Hence, it follows that everyone who has uprightness- (204) of-will has justice and is just (since everyone who has justice is just). But it seems to me that eternal life is promised not to all who are just, but only to those who are just without any injustice. For these are properly and unqualifiedly called just in heart and upright in heart. For [there is a case where] someone is just in some respect and unjust in another respect (for example, a man who is both chaste and envious). The happiness of the just is not promised to such individuals, since even as true happiness exists without any deficiency, so it is given only to him who is just without being at all unjust.

De Concordia 3.5 (p. 205)
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Therefore, grace and free choice are not incompatible but cooperate in order to justify and to save a man -- even as, although natural functioning procreates an offspring only by means of a mother and not without a father, nevertheless no accurate account excludes either a father or a mother from an offspring's generation.

De Concordia 3.12 (p. 219)
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In itself, to be sure, uprightness is a cause of no evil merit but is the mother of every good merit. For uprightness favors the spirit as it strives against the flesh; and uprightness "delights in the law of God in accordance with the inner man," i.e., in accordance with the spirit [which strives against the flesh]. However, [even] if evil sometimes seems to follow from uprightness, it does not proceed from uprightness but proceeds from something else. Indeed, because of their uprightness the apostles were a good odor unto God. But the fact that unto certain men the apostles were "the odor of death unto death" did not proceed from their justice but from evil men's wickedness. Now, the will for willing what is beneficial is not always evil, but is evil when it consents to the flesh as it strives against the spirit.

De Concordia 3.13 (pp. 219-22)
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(219) But in order to understand this matter more clearly, we must investigate how the will [for what is beneficial] became so corrupt and so prone to evil. For we must not believe that in our first parents God created it prone to evil. Now, when I stated that because of sin human nature became corrupt and acquired appetites similar to those of brute animals, I did not explain how such a will arose in man. Indeed, base appetites are one thing; a corrupt will that assents to these appetites is another thing. Therefore, it seems to me, we must ask about how such a will became the lot of man.

The cause of such a will as this shall readily become apparent to us if we consider the original condition of rational nature. The intention of God was to create rational nature just and happy in order that it would enjoy Him. Now, it was able to be neither just nor happy without the will-for-justice and the will-for- (220) happiness. Assuredly, the will-for-justice is itself justice; but the will-for-happiness is not happiness because not everyone who has the will-for-happiness has happiness. However, everyone believes that happiness -- whether angelic happiness is meant or the happiness which Adam had in Paradise -- includes a sufficiency of suitable benefits and excludes all need. For although the happiness of angels is greater than the happiness of man in Paradise, still Adam cannot be denied to have had happiness. For, indeed, nothing prevents Adam from having been happy in Paradise and free of all need, in spite of the fact that angelic happiness was greater than his. (By comparison, an intense heat is free of all cold; and, nevertheless, there can be another more intense heat. And cold is free of all heat, even though there can be a more intense cold.) To be sure, having less of a thing than does another is not always identical with being in need; to be in need is to be deprived of something when it ought to be possessed -- a condition which was not true of Adam. Where there is need there is unhappiness. God created rational nature for knowing and loving Him; but it is not the case that He created it unhappy when it had no antecedent guilt. Therefore, God created man happy and in need of nothing. Hence, at one and the same time rational nature received (1) the will-for-happiness, (2) happiness, (3) the will-for-justice (i.e., uprightness which is justice itself), and (4) free choice, without which rational nature could not have kept justice.

Now, God so ordained these two "wills," or inclinations, that (1) the will-as-instrument would use the will-which-is-justice for commanding and governing (though being itself instructed by the spirit, which is also called mind and reason), and that (2) without any detriment it would use the other will to the end of obedience. Indeed, God gave happiness to man -- not to speak of the angels -- for man's benefit. But He gave man justice for His own honor. [He gave] justice in such a way that man was able to abandon it, so that if he did not abandon it but kept it perseveringly, he would merit being elevated to fellowship with the angels. But if man did abandon justice, he would not thereafter be able to regain it by himself; nor would he attain to the happiness of the angels. Rather, he would be deprived of that happiness which he possessed; and falling into the likeness of brute animals, he would be subjected with them to corruption and to the appetites I have often mentioned. Nevertheless, the will-for-happiness would remain in (221) order that by means of man's need for the goods which he had lost he would be justly punished with deep unhappiness. Therefore, since he abandoned justice, he lost happiness. And the will which he received as being good and as being for his own good is fervent with desire for benefits which it is unable to keep from willing. And because it is unable to have the true benefits which are suitable for rational nature but which rational nature has lost, it turns itself to benefits which are false and which pertain to brute animals and which bestial appetites suggest. And thus when the will inordinately wills these benefits it either (1) shuns uprightness, so that it does not accept uprightness when uprightness is offered, or else (2) it casts uprightness away after having received it. But when the will wills these benefits within proper bounds, it neither shuns nor casts away uprightness.

So the will-as-instrument was created good, with respect to the fact that it has being; moreover, it was created just and having the power to keep the justice it received. And in the above manner it was made evil by free choice. [It was made evil] not insofar as it exists but insofar as it was made unjust as a result of the absence of justice, which was freely abandoned and which it was always supposed to have. Moreover, it now became powerless to will the justice it had deserted. For it is not the case that by free choice the will can will justice when it does not have justice -- as it is the case that by free choice the will can keep justice when it has justice. Furthermore, the will-for-the-beneficial, a will which was created good insofar as it is something, became evil (i.e., unjust) because it was not subordinate to justice, without which it ought to will nothing. Therefore, since the will-as-instrument freely became unjust: after having abandoned justice, it remains (as regards its own power) a servant of injustice and unjust by necessity. For it is unable by itself to return to justice; and without justice the will is never free, because without justice the natural freedom of choice is idle. The will was also made the servant of its own inclination for the beneficial, because once justice has been removed, the will is able to will only what this inclination wills.

I predicate "to will" of both the instrument and its inclination; for the instrument is will, and the inclination is will. And without impropriety "to will" is predicated of both these wills. For the instrument, which wills by means of its inclination does indeed (222) will; and the inclination, by means of which the instrument wills, also wills. (Similarly, "to see" is predicated both of the man who sees by means of sight and of the sight by which the man sees.) Hence, we can without absurdity say that the inclinations of this will which I have called the soul's instrument are, so to speak, "instruments" of this instrument, because it does something only by means of them. Therefore, when the "instrument"-for-willing-justice (i.e., when uprightness) has been lost, the will-as-instrument cannot at all will justice, unless justice is restored by grace. Therefore, since the will-as-instrument ought to will nothing except justly, whatever it wills without uprightness, it wills unjustly. None of the appetites which the apostle calls the flesh and concupiscence are evil or unjust with respect to the fact that they exist; rather they are called unjust because they are present in a rational nature, where they ought not to be found. For, indeed, they are not evil or unjust in brute animals, because they ought to be present there.

De Concordia 3.14 (p. 222)
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From what has already been said above, one can recognize that the reason a man does not always possess justice (which he ought always to have) is that he cannot at all acquire or regain it by himself.

De Concordia 2.2 (p. 197)
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(197) . . . we must notice that predestination can be said [to apply] not only to good men but also to evil men -- even as God is said to cause (because He permits) evils which He does not cause. For He is said to harden a man when He does not soften him, and to lead him into temptation when He does not deliver him. Hence, it is not inappropriate if in this manner we say that God predestines evil men and their evil works when He does not correct them and their evil works. But He is more properly said to foreknow and to predestine good works, because in them He causes both what they are [essentially] and the fact that they are good. But in evil deeds He causes only what they are essentially; He does not cause the fact that they are evil -- as I have already said above. We must also realize that just as foreknowledge is not properly said to be found in God, so predestination is not either. For nothing is present to God either earlier or later, but all things are present to Him at once.

De Concordia 2.3 (pp. 197-98)
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(197) Let us now consider whether some things which are going to occur as a result of free choice can be predestined. Surely, we ought not to doubt that God's foreknowledge and predestination do not conflict. Instead, just as He foreknows, so also He predestines. In the discussion about foreknowledge we saw clearly that, without any inconsistency, some actions which are going to occur as a result of free choice, are foreknown. Therefore, reason and plain truth also teach that, without any inconsistency, some actions which are going to occur by means of free choice, are likewise predestined. For God neither foreknows nor predestines that anyone will be just by necessity. For he who does not keep justice by means of his free will is not just. Therefore, although things foreknown and predestined must occur, it is nonetheless (198) equally true that some things foreknown and predestined occur not by the necessity which precedes a thing and causes it, but by the necessity which succeeds a thing -- as I have said above. For although God predestines these things, He causes them not by constraining or restraining the will but by leaving the will to its own power. But although the will uses its own power, it does nothing which God does not cause -- in good works by His grace, in evil works not through any fault of His but through the will's fault. (As I promised, this shall become clearer when I shall speak about grace.) And just as foreknowledge, which is not mistaken, foreknows only the real thing as it will occur -- either necessarily or freely -- so predestination, which is not altered, predestines only as the thing exists in foreknowledge. And although what is foreknown is immutable in eternity, it can nevertheless be changed in the temporal order at some point before it occurs. Similarly, the case is in every respect the same for predestination.

Therefore, if these statements which have been made are examined closely, it is evident from them that predestination does not exclude free choice and that free choice is not opposed to predestination. For, indeed, all the considerations by which I have shown above that free choice is not incompatible with foreknowledge show equally that it is compatible with predestination. Therefore, whenever something happens by the agency of free will (e.g., when one man wrongs another man and as a result is killed by this other), it is unreasonable for certain people to give vent loudly to the words: "Thus it was foreknown and predestined by God; and hence it was done by necessity and could not have been done otherwise." Indeed, neither the man who provoked the other by a wrong nor the other who avenged himself did this by necessity. Rather, [each acted] voluntarily, because if each had not freely willed to, neither one would have done what he did.